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Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities:
Are First Amendment Values Functionally
Incompatible with Equal Protection
Principles?
ALAN E. BROWNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTIONT HE restriction of hate speech' on the campuses of public universi-
ties2 raises complex issues of constitutional law. That apparently
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. The author wishes to thank Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky of the University of Southern California, and Professors Kevin Johnson, Jean
Love and Joan Howarth (visiting) of the University of California, Davis, for reading drafts of this
article and for providing helpful criticism. I also want to acknowledge the help I received from my
research assistant, Jennifer Nelson.
1. The term "hate speech" refers to language that vilifies and holds up to hatred and contempt
the members of any group that generally meets the Supreme Court's criteria for a suspect class.
Groups defined by their race or nationality are the paradigm examples. See Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-47
(1985) (describing and applying criteria used to identify a suspect class). These same criteria identify
groups defined by gender as a quasi-suspect class. See, eg., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A strong argument may be
made that religious minorities should also be recoguized as a suspect class. See Brownstein, Harmo-
nizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality,
and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 102-12 (1990) [hereinafter Heavenly and Earthly
Spheres].
In discussing examples of hate speech in the text, I have struggled to reconcile two conflicting
beliefs. I believe that hate speech, like other acts of cruelty and insensitivity, is easier to defend as an
abstraction. Illustrations involving explicit epithets argue the case for regulation more powerfully
than do examples using euphemisms. On the other hand, too frequent and careless use of pejorative
language can trivialize the demeaning impact of such terms. It may also cause unnecessary discom-
fort to some readers.
Accordingly, in the examples in the text, I use the first and last letters of common epithets with
dashes in between. Only in more abstract discussions are offensive terms stated explicitly. I assume
that virtually all readers are familiar enough with common hate speech that this will not interfere
with anyone's understanding of the text.
2. This article only addresses restrictions of hate speech on the campuses of public universities
because that location raises the most serious constitutional issues. It is generally recognized that
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benign statement may today be both controversial and a minority posi-
tion. Battle lines are drawn quickly when college administrators promul-
gate policies to limit the use of racist, ethnic, and sexist epithets and
other pejorative language directed at minorities and women.
In the resulting debate, some free-speech proponents argue that the
first amendment permits relatively few limits on what may be said at a
public university. They believe that within the framework of tradition-
ally protected expression, the academic environment should be the quin-
tessential, unregulated marketplace of ideas.' Other writers, dismayed
and angered by the pain and harm that hate speech causes its victims,
support a categorical response to the problem.' Joining those commenta-
tors who challenged the judicial decision protecting the right of Ameri-
can Nazis to march through Skokie, Illinois in 1977,6 these authors
advocate the designation of a new classification of unprotected speech
that the government may regulate in the same way that it currently re-
administrative decisions restricting speech at private colleges are not as rigorously constrained by the
first amendment. The conventional reason for this distinction is the lack of state action in the deci-
sions of private universities. See, eg., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d
Cir. 1973); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1971). See generally Annotation,
Action of Private Institutions of Higher Education as Constituting State Action, or Action Under Color
of Law, for Purposes of Fourteenth Amendment and 42 US. CS. § 1983, 37 A.L.R. FED. 601 (1978).
3. See generally Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom," COMMEN-
TARY, Sept. 1989, at 17; France, Hate Speech Goes to College, 76 A.B.A.J., July 1990, at 44; Law-
rence & Gunther, Good Speech, Bad Speech, STANFORD LAWYER, Spring 1990, at 4; Kaufman,
Nibble at Freedom, and Risk Losing It All, L. A. Times, July 31, 1990, § B, at 7, col. 4; Free Speech
Issue Gets Re-Examined, L. A. Daily J., July 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5; Wilson, College's Anti-Harassment
Policies Bring Controversy Over Free Speech Issues, 36 Chron. Higher Educ. 1, Oct. 4, 1989, at 1, col.
2; UCs Doctrine of Silence, The Recorder, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 2; Russo, Free Speech at Tufts:
Zoned Out, N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1989, at A29, col. 2; Gunther, Stanford's Free Speech Debate,
Sacramento Bee, May 8, 1989, at B-11, col. 4.
4. See generally supra note 3. These materials describe the challenges raised by students, profes-
sors and civil libertarians to hate speech regulations at particular universities. For example, Floyd
Abrams, a prominent civil liberties attorney, criticized the Northern California ACLU for failing to
challenge the University of California's hate speech policy. Abrams argued, "[to call offensive lan-
guage a denial of access, and then to use it to trump a First Amendment right is a failure of courage
for any civil liberties organization." UC's Doctrine of Silence, supra note 3.
5. See, e-g., Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. Rtv. 2320, 2357 (1989) [hereinafter Public Response] (arguing that persecutorial, hateful,
and degrading messages of inferiority directed against historically oppressed groups should be
"treated as outside the realm of protected discourse"); Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insult, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) [hereinafter
Words that Wound].
6. See, eg., Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 629 (1985); Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt
In, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 77 (1984) [hereinafter Big Brother].
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stricts obscenity,7 fighting words,8 and speech that constitutes a clear and
present danger of unlawful conduct.9
The purpose of this article is to respectfully challenge the free
speech position. Indeed, this article is principally directed at first amend-
ment proponents, including members of the university community, who
properly bristle at content and viewpoint discrimination and shiver when
administrators exercise regulatory discretion in limiting expression of
any kind. The article's objective is to convince these readers that hate
speech on public property is not as immune from careful regulation as
some first amendment defenders suggest. Significant restrictions on hate
speech at public universities are consistent not only with current consti-
tutional doctrine but also with those cases and principles typically en-
dorsed, or at least respected, by civil libertarians.
This article does not, however, endorse a categorical first amend-
ment exception for hate speech.10 Rather, it attempts to establish a mid-
7. Obscenity is patently offensive expression that appeals to a prurient interest in sex. The com-
plete legal definition is set out in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The dissemination of
obscene material, even between consenting adults, may be suppressed by the state through criminal
sanctions. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
8. In theory, speech involving fighting words, that is, "face-to-face words plainly likely to cause
a breach of the peace by the addressee," may be prohibited. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 573 (1942). This doctrine has been sharply limited, however, and is seldom used to sustain
the conviction of speakers whose expression arguably constitutes fighting words unless the threat of
violence is actually imminent. See K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LAN-
GUAGE 293-94 (1989); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 929 n.9 (2d ed. 1988).
9. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[Ihe constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
10. Although concerns raised by writers who describe the harm that hate speech produces can-
not be lightly dismissed, see K. GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 141-57, 287-313; Words that Wound,
supra note 5; Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 445, 462-67 (1987);
Public Response, supra note 5, I am nonetheless generally unsympathetic towards the idea that any
form of speech is completely beyond the scope of first amendment protection.
Certainly, the Supreme Court's experience in identifying specific categories of unprotected speech
does not encourage this approach. The Court at one time found group libel to be unprotected speech
and subject to criminal sanction. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (law prohibiting
speech that defames a large but discrete group of individuals such as a racial minority upheld).
Subsequent first amendment cases have severely undermined the reasoning of Beauharnais, however,
and there is serious doubt that it continues to have significant value as precedent on this issue. See
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); L. TRIBE,
supra note 8, at 926-67. while the Court continues to hold that obscene expression is unprotected
speech, it undermines any objective justification for that conclusion by defining obscenity in subjec-
tive terms by reference to local community standards, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and
by its decision to protect obscene materials in home libraries, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
A more sensible first amendment model rejecting a categorical approach to regulating speech is
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dle ground position where hate speech, though generally protected, is
subject to some regulation. Implicit in this position is the recognition
that the extent to which hate speech may be restricted is limited, and that
important distinctions must be drawn between different intra-campus lo-
cations and contexts.
This article also does not propose a model regulation that neatly
identifies each instance where hate speech may be prohibited. Nor does
it resolve the difficult problems of line-drawing and balancing that will
necessarily be faced by administrators and judges if its thesis is accepted.
The purpose of the article is a narrow one. It seeks to demonstrate that
complex line-drawing and balancing are intrinsic and unavoidable parts
of any first amendment analysis of speech restrictions on public univer-
sity property.
Part I of the article examines the restriction of racist speech on pub-
lic university campuses under the Supreme Court's forum analysis. It
evaluates the standards of review applied to the regulation of speech on
public property serving specific purposes, and suggests how these rules
should be applied to public universities. Part II discusses how this con-
stitutional analysis changes when the expression to be regulated on pub-
lic property arguably impairs or interferes with the implementation of
other constitutional principles. This section seeks to reconcile the con-
stitutional protection afforded freedom of speech with the equal protec-
suggested by Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather than attempting to define a particular type of expression as obscene
and, therefore, completely beyond first amendment protection, Brennan argued that the Court
should examine the distribution of obscene material in context. The regulation of obscene expression
should be upheld only in those circumstances where the dissemination conflicts with particular and
important state interests such as the protection of children and unconsenting adults from exposure to
sexually explicit materials. Id. at 106-14.
In any case, refuting the categorical restriction of hate speech is beyond the scope of this article.
The argument that all, or virtually all, hate speech may be categorically prohibited is only relevant to
the thesis of this article as a reminder that all-or-nothing definitional balancing has its risks as well as
its virtues, and that those risks are inherent in any absolutist approach to first amendment problems.
The categorical rejection of hate speech flounders under many of the same criticisms that may be
fairly leveled at those who condemn any restriction of hate speech whatsoever. Not the least of these
is the judgment that the uncompromising support of either polar position increases the legitimacy of
the extreme counter argument. For example, it is more difficult to persuade an audience reasonably
concerned about the harmful effects of hate speech that a categorical exception should not be carved
out of the first amendment if one insists that even the most modest and temperate attempt to regulate
such expression on public property must be rejected out of hand as being totally inconsistent with
free speech values. Similarly, the surest way to convince a first amendment absolutist that he or she
should hold fast to an uncompromising position is to argue that all hate speech should be unpro-
tected because even the indirect and attenuated consequences of such communications are too dan-
gerous to be tolerated.
[Vol. 39
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tion guarantees of equal access and equal worth provided to suspect
classes.
I. THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY AS A FORUM
A. The Nature of Forum Analysis
Supreme Court case law evaluating restrictions on speech on public
property classifies the property in question as a type of forum in order to
determine the appropriate standard of review to apply to the challenged
regulation.11 Three basic models or types of forum are recognized.
Speech is most stringently protected in the traditional public forum, the
classic paradigm of which is a public street or park.'2 Here, content or
viewpoint discrimination receives strict scrutiny, 13 and content-neutral
laws are subject to a rigorous multifactor balancing test. 4 At the other
extreme is the nonpublic forum, a category which describes public prop-
erty of uncertain suitability for private expression. 5 Although viewpoint
discrimination is still carefully reviewed in nonpublic forums, both con-
tent-discriminatory and content-neutral regulations limiting expression
in these locations will be upheld if found to be reasonable. 16
The Court has been imprecise and inconsistent in defining the third
type of forum. Although the case law refers to this intermediate category
as both a "designated" public forum'7 and a "limited" public forum,"8
11. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985):
[Tihe Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Govern-
ment's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the
interest of those wishing to use the property for other [expressive] purposes. Accord-
ingly, the extent to whiqh the Government can control access depends on the nature of
the relevant forum.
12. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
13. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
14. Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenbush Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
132 (1981)). Content-neutral regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression must be "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a siguificant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels
of communication."
15. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805-06 (annual charitable fund-raising drive conducted in the
federal workplace is not public forum).
16. Id. at 806 (citing Peny, 460 U.S. at 49).
17. Id. at 803 (referring to "a public forum by designation") (citing Council of Greenbush Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 130 n.6). See also M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, § 4.09[D], at
4-71 n.168 (1984). Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46, and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981)
adopt the same forum concept but do not actually use the term "designated." Rather, they describe
the state creating or opening a forum for expressive use even though it is not required to do so.
18. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48; Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
655 (1980); M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 4-71 n.168.
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these classifications encompass two distinct standards of review applica-
ble to speech restrictions. The designated forum standard is based on the
intent of the government to open up public property to a particular class
of speaker or subject of expression. In analyzing speech regulations
under this standard, the Court inquires whether the excluded expression
would reasonably fall within the favored class of speakers or subjects that
the government has deliberately admitted to the forum in question. The
inherent subjectivity and circularity of this approach, however, substan-
tially undermine its utility to persons seeking to challenge location-based
constraints on their expressive activities.19 The alternative model, the
limited forum, applies a functional compatibility test to determine
19. The Court uses the designated public forum concept in two ways, both of which raise seri-
ous analytic difficulties. In the first, because the government opens up property, which would other-
wise be classified as a nonpublic forum, to virtually all public discourse, the exclusion of any speaker
or subject of expression receives strict scrutiny review. Widmar, 454 U.S. 263, is the paradigm
example of this kind of analysis. See also United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990);
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (1983).
The problem with this definition of a designated public forum is the uncertain criteria for deter-
mining that it exists. The Court has emphasized that "[t]he government does not create a public
forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontradi-
tional forum for public discourse." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. If the government's purpose is the
controlling factor, however, presumably all the state must do to avoid rigorous review of its decision
to bar particular speakers from its property is to make clear that these exclusions are deliberate acts
rather than oversights.
The Court also explains that it looks to "the policy and practice of the government to ascertain
whether it intended to designate a place.., as a public forum." Id. Does this mean that if the state
allows a sufficient number of diverse speakers to use its property it will be found to have inadver-
tently designated a public forum? The language of several recent cases seems to reject that possibil-
ity as inconsistent with the Court's focus on the government's intent. See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at
3121 ("[A] practice of allowing some speech activities on [public] property [does] not add up to the
dedication of [public] property to speech activities."); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 ("[S]elective access does
not transform government property into a public forum.").
Moreover, the intent principle is subject to self-justifying manipulation by both the state and the
courts, however it is defined. How many speakers must be kept out of the forum to establish an
intent not to open it to the general public? More than one, obviously, or the very act of the state in
excluding the speaker prevents the speaker from claiming that he or she has been barred from a
designated forum. Whatever number is adopted, however, the state can always exclude one disfa-
vored speaker, and still avoid designated forum status, by barring a few other unpopular speakers
until it reaches the threshold figure.
The Court's second use of the designated forum concept suggests that a forum can be opened and
dedicated to a circumscribed group of speakers or topics as opposed to the general public. The
Court describes this partially open, designated forum in tentative terms as if it is uncertain that such
forums really exist for constitutional purposes. See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118; Perry, 460 U.S. at
48. More importantly, it is unclear whether this concept can actually help an excluded speaker gain
access to a forum from which he or she has been barred. With regard to a partially designated
forum, "[t]he Constitutional right of access would in any event extend only to other entities of
similar character." Perry, 460 U.S. at 48. In addition, the state's justification for treating the ex-
cluded speaker as dissimilar from those granted access will be reviewed under the reasonableness
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whether the prohibited expression would materially impair or disrupt the
use to which the public property in question is being put.2"
Under this forum approach to first amendment cases, the Supreme
Court determines the standard of review it will use by identifying the
property to be regulated as either a traditional public forum, a limited or
designated public forum, or a nonpublic forum. While the rigor of the
review applied decreases along the continuum from traditional to non-
standard applied to speech regulations governing nonpublic forums. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118-19.
See also M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 4-71 n.168.
20. A functional compatibility standard permits the regulation of speech on public property in
order to prevent expression from significantly interfering with the use to which the property is being
put. Accordingly, how the state uses its property and the effect of speech on that activity are critical
elements of the limited public forum analysis. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650-51 ("Consideration of a
forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of
the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the
particular forum involved."). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (special characteristics of the school environment). Other cases apply a functional
compatibility standard of review to speech regulations on public property without clarifying why it is
appropriate to do so. See, eg., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Nevertheless, an argument can be made, based upon recent case law, that the limited public
forum no longer exists. Language in Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3117-18, Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803-06,
and Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, suggests that if public property is neither a traditional public forum nor a
designated public forum, then it is a nonpublic forum. The rejoinder to this contention, however, is
sufficiently strong that the issue remains open. Some of the cases cited in support of the limited
public forum's demise equivocate. For example, Justice White in Perry considered a limited public
forum argument, but it was based in part on the government allowing some speakers access to the
public property. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Kokinda would have sounded
the death knell of the limited public forum if she had convinced four other Justices to join her in
characterizing an interior side walk in front of a post office as a nonpublic rather than a limited
public forum. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct at 3120-21. If an interior sidewalk in front of a post office is not a
limited public forum, it is hard to imagine any other property which deserves to be so identified.
O'Connor's opinion, however, did not command a majority of the Court. Justice Kennedy pro-
vided the critical fifth vote in upholding the anti-solicitation ban on the interior post office sidewalk,
but he refused to join O'Connor in characterizing the sidewalk as a nonpublic forum:
If our public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain
objective characteristics of Government property and its customary use by the public
may control the case. While it is proper to weigh the need to maintain the dignity and
purpose of a public building, or to impose special security requirements [on public prop-
erty], other factors may point to the conclusion that the Government must permit wider
access to the forum than it has otherwise intended.
Id. at 3125 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Finally, many of the Court's functional compatibility cases, including those most relevant to this
article, have not specifically been overruled and, therefore, continue to stand as good law. See
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; see infra notes 42-73 and accompanying text.
Although the Court does not carefully distinguish between "limited public forums" and "desig-
nated public forums," see, eg., Perry, 460 U.S. at 48 (Court suggests that there may be a designated
limited public forum if state intentionally creates a forum that is only partially open), for purposes of
clarity I believe it is easier to define limited public forums with a functional compatibility analysis
and designated forums (whether fully or partially open) with an intent analysis.
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public forum, however, the primary basis for regulating speech on public
property remains the same regardless of the nature of the forum. Private
expressive activities cannot substantially interfere with the use to which
public property is being put by the state. What varies between forums is
the severity with which the Court scrutinizes the state's claims of incom-
patibility and interference between expression and the property's func-
tion, and the weight assigned by the Court to free speech interests in
balancing them against the state's need to fulfill its legitimate objectives
on government property. Obviously, it is easier for the state to argue
that its concerns about the disruptive effect of speech are reasonable than
it is to establish that the prohibition of speech is necessary to the further-
ance of a compelling state interest.2 1 Nonetheless, at some point the need
to curtail speech in order to facilitate the state's use of its property must
clearly constitute the kind of compelling state interest required by strict
scrutiny.
Thus, a broad range of first amendment interpretations may be
grounded on a forum analysis. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's most
recent cases have been solidly lodged at the end of the forum continuum
that is least protective of freedom of expression. Although these deci-
sions are not endorsed in this article, it is important to understand their
scope in order to properly evaluate alternative arguments which justify
speech regulations on public property.22
21. Thus, in Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3124, Justice O'Connor supported a total ban on solicitation
on interior sidewalks in front of post offices, a nonpublic forum under her analysis, because a general
"description of the disruption and delay caused by solicitation rings of 'common sense,' which is
sufficient in this Court to uphold a regulation under reasonableness review." Id. (quoting Heffron,
452 U.S. at 665). That the post office's efficiency concerns could be alleviated by adopting regula-
tions which were less burdensome to expression was irrelevant. Id. By contrast, the Court in Heft
fron determined that a state fairground was a limited public forum. While the Court upheld
regulations requiring that solicitation activities be limited to fixed booths at the fair, it did so by
balancing the state's interests in crowd control and fraud prevention against the burden these regula-
tions imposed on petitioners' opportunities for expression. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649-50. The booth
regulations, far from being a total ban, provided organizations "an adequate means to sell and solicit
on the fairgrounds," and did not "unnecessarily limit" their first amendment rights. Id. at 654-55.
In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), the Court utilized a
more rigorous standard of review in invalidating a municipal ordinance which required solicitors to
prove that at least seventy-five percent of the proceeds they obtained would be used for charitable
purposes before they could solicit funds on the public streets, a traditional public forum. While the
city's objectives of preventing fraud and protecting residential privacy were strong and legitimate
interests, they could not be advanced through laws that intrusively interfered with first amendment
freedoms, even if alternative regulatory approaches would be less efficient and convenient for the
authorities. Id. at 636-39.
22. There is more than one way to justify the regulation of hate speech in public universities.
Contemporary case law, often unsympathetic to free speech values, provides one doctrinal approach
for doing so. The thesis of this article is that an alternative analysis can accomplish the same result
1991] REGULATING HATE SPEECH
Current case law applying the Court's forum analysis would permit
significant restrictions of hate speech on university property which was
determined to constitute a nonpublic forum. That important locations
within the college environment could be so identified is no longer im-
probable. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,=3 the Supreme
Court concluded that a high school journalism class was not a public
forum since school authorities had not "'intentionally open[ed] a non-
traditional forum for public discourse.' "24 The Court's analysis in Ha-
zelwood, focusing as it did on the plaintiff's failure to show that the state
had deliberately opened its property for indiscriminate use, is equally ap-
plicable to a university program.25
In a nonpublic forum, speech regulations covering high school and
university activities receive relatively lenient review from the Court.
Content-discriminatory and content-neutral rules are upheld if they are
reasonable in their purpose and manner of operation.26 Only viewpoint
discrimination is subject to close scrutiny.27 While regulations banning
without repudiating core first amendment principles. The dissonance between these two frameworks
causes some awkwardness in discussing the cases. The alternative analysis uses precedent that is still
technically good law, in the sense that it has not been formally overruled, but which may carry little
weight with the current Court. The former approach is based on reasoning the Court favors, but
which is correctly rejected by free speech advocates as unsatisfactory. It is, of course, important to
understand the current case law because it defines the practical parameters of what is constitution-
ally possible and likely. Readers should not, however, confuse these discussions of what is the case
with the author's sense of what the law ought to be.
The true dilemma here is really a practical one. The arguments suggested in this article justify
hate speech regulations in a way that recognizes and reconciles both first amendment and equal
protection values. These arguments, however, may not be persuasive to a Court that is generally
unsympathetic to both principles. The only way to convince this Court to sustain such regulations
may be to base one's arguments on the truncated vision of the first amendment that a majority of the
current Justices seem to endorse.
23. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
24. Id. at 267 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). See also Planned Parenthood v. Clark
County School Dist., 887 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that high school newspapers, yearbook,
and athletic event programs are nonpublic fora because school authorities did not open them for
indiscriminate expressive activity).
25. See generally Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (11th
Cir. 1989) (applying Hazelwood analysis to university speech regulations).
26. Content discrimination refers to regulations based on the subject of expression. A law
prohibiting political speech on a military base would constitute content discrimination. For exam-
pies of the use of the reasonableness standard to review content discrimination, see Searcey v. Harris,
888 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 1989) (equating Hazelwood reasoning with nonpublic forum rea-
sonableness standard of review described in Cornelius); Alabama Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1346-47
(upholding "reasonable" university speech regulations).
27. Viewpoint discrimination regulates only one of the contending positions within a subject of
discourse. A law prohibiting pro choice but not pro life arguments relating to abortion would consti-
tute viewpoint discrimination.
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racist epithets would ordinarily be construed to be viewpoint discrimina-
tion under traditional analysis, at least one recent decision casts doubt on
that conclusion and supports the application of a less rigorous content
discrimination standard.
In Boos v. Barry,28 Justice O'Connor's opinion construed a District
of Columbia regulation prohibiting the display of any sign within 500
feet of a foreign embassy, if the sign tended to bring that government into
"public odium" or "public disrepute,"29 to be content discrimination
rather than viewpoint discrimination.30 O'Connor explained that since
expression censuring any foreign government's policies would be re-
strained by this provision, the law did not single out a particular view-
point for disfavored treatment. Rather, it prohibited "an entire category
of speech-signs or displays critical of foreign governments."31 Using
similar logic, a regulation which prohibited vulgar language asserting the
inferiority or negative characteristics of any ethnic or racial group would
constitute content discrimination, and therefore be sustainable in a non-
public forum if found to be reasonable.32
The contention that regulating racial and ethnic epithets would in-
volve content rather than viewpoint discrimination is further bolstered
by the Court's reasoning in offensive speech cases such as FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.33 In upholding the FCC's reprimand of the Pacifica radio
station for its broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue,
Justice Stevens emphasized that the FCC's action did not constitute
viewpoint discrimination. It was not Carlin's point of view that the gov-
ernment objected to, but the manner in which he expressed it.34 Thus,
Stevens argued, the FCC's language restriction was based on the content
of speech, and not on the message being conveyed.35 An analogy of this
reasoning to ethnic epithets suggests that the exclusion from classroom
discourse of words such as "nigger," "kike" and "mick" would be re-
28. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
29. Id. at 316.
30. The line between these two types of regulations can, however, often be unclear. The regula-
tion in Boos, prohibiting signs critical of foreign governments, could also be described as viewpoint
rather than content discrimination, since signs complimenting foreign governments were not
prohibited.
31. Id. at 319.
32. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School Dist., 887 F.2d 935, 946 (9th Cir.
1989) (High school authorities acted reasonably in refusing to allow "controversial" advertisements
from Planned Parenthood in high school publications.).
33. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
34. Id. at 746 n.22.
35. Id. at 744.
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viewed and upheld in most cases as reasonable content regulation.36
The argument that public universities are nonpublic forums is not,
however, completely convincing. There is longstanding and significant
support in the cases for the contrary proposition that, as a general mat-
ter, public universities constitute some type of public forum.37 Recent
precedent does not clearly supersede these older cases. Moreover, free
speech advocates, who are properly critical of the ease with which cur-
rent nonpublic forum cases uphold speech regulations, will be unper-
suaded by decisions suggesting that universities are nonpublic forums,
and unimpressed by arguments predicated on such a dubious founda-
tion.38 Decisions such as Pacifica, which substantially reduce the protec-
tion afforded "indecent" and offensive speech, are likely to receive similar
disapproval.39
On the other hand, first amendment proponents may read too much
into favorable decisions of the last three decades when they argue that
the university must, in most respects, be treated as a traditional public
forum. A more accurate description would recognize that the typical
university campus includes many different kinds of property dedicated to
a variety of functions. Some areas and uses are properly identified as
traditional public forums. Others are nonpublic forums. Although some
first amendment advocates may argue that, in general, the strict rules
governing traditional public forums are a more appropriate basis for re-
viewing university speech regulations, a fair reading of the case law sup-
ports a more moderate position. Those parts of the university directly
involved in the educational enterprise, such as classroom activities, are
better understood as limited public forums in which speech regulations
are subject to an objective, functional compatibility standard of review.'
Indeed, even those Justices with the strongest commitment to freedom of
36. In distinguishing the broadcast in question in Pacifica, Stevens implied that indecent speech
in works of literary merit, such as the "occasional expletive" in an "Elizabethan comedy" would be
protected. Id. at 750. Under similar reasoning, reading the word "nigger" in Huckleberry Finn
would not subject the speaker to sanction.
37. See infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
38. See M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 4-73 - 4-74 (submitting that "the Court has erred insofar
as it has used the speech-dedicated standard rather than the incompatibility standard in applying the
public forum concept"); L. TRINE., supra note 8, at 996 (describing the Court in recent nonpublic
forum cases as operating "[i]n a cloud of logic that threatened quickly to evaporate in circles of
tautology," with the decision in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985), having "effectively turned the public forum doctrine on its head").
39. See, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 17, at 3-29 (regretting the Court's apparent retreat from
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in FCC v. Pacifica Found.); Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 282-96 (1981).
40. See supra note 20.
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speech appear to accept a functional compatibility analysis in cases of
this kind.41
1. The Functional Compatibility Foundation-Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.4" In Tinker, the
Supreme Court forcefully vindicated the first amendment rights of high
school students to wear black arm bands to school to protest United
States policies in Vietnam. The Court declared that students and teach-
ers do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate."4 School authorities cannot suppress
expression to avoid controversy or "the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."'  Nor can they use
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance ' 45 as an all-pur-
pose justification for silencing student speech when no evidence exists to
support their institutional concerns. Tinker is a landmark opinion in
protecting student rights of expression by five of the most stalwart first
amendment champions the Court has produced: Justices Fortas, War-
ren, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. No future Court is likely to be
more protective of first -amendment values than this majority.
Nevertheless, Tinker is also an analytically ambiguous opinion. To
begin with, it never identified the category of forum into which a public
high school falls. More importantly, although the Court pointedly noted
that only one symbol representing a particular point of view was singled
out and restricted by the authorities, the majority did not apply strict
scrutiny to the challenged restriction.46 It would be difficult to imagine a
more glaring omission from traditional doctrine.
Far from adopting a public forum standard, Tinker in effect repre-
sents a pure functional compatibility analysis. Free speech rights must
be evaluated "in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment."'47 Accordingly, speech must be permitted unless it "'materially
and substantially'" interferes with the school's educational program.4 8
Although the Court in Tinker never spelled out exactly what consti-
tutes such a sanctionable interference with a school's educational pro-
41. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
42. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
43. Id. at 506.
44. Id. at 509.
45. Id. at 508.
46. Id. at 510-11.
47. Id. at 506.
48. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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gram, one point is repeatedly made clear. Student expressive activity
may be limited if it intrudes "upon the work of the school[ ]"49 or inter-
feres "with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone." 5 By implication, even viewpoint discrimination could be upheld
under this analysis. The Court argued that "the prohibition of expres-
sion of one particular opinion.., is not constitutionally permissible," but
added the important caveat: "at least without evidence that it is neces-
sary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline.""1
2. The Tinker College Progeny-Healy, Papish, and Widmar.
Tinker is a high school case. On its face it says nothing about the regula-
tion of speech on a public university campus. Moreover, several subse-
quent decisions involving the review of college speech regulations contain
language suggesting that a more rigorous standard of review is appropri-
ate on the college campus. Those who argue that the regulation of hate
speech on public university campuses involves a retreat from existing first
amendment doctrine 2 must predicate their arguments on a narrow inter-
pretation of Tinker and a very favorable construction of these later cases.
No other authority is available to support their position.
That analysis, however, is unpersuasive. A careful reading of the
later cases demonstrates that they do not broadly provide a different
standard of first amendment protection for universities than the Court
endorsed in Tinker. Indeed, Tinker is repeatedly cited and quoted with
favor. What distinguishes Tinker from the college cases, if anything, are
the Court's underlying assumptions about the nature of a university's
functions and the degree of compatibility the Court believes exists be-
tween free expression on a university campus and a college's regular edu-
cational activities.
The first, and perhaps best known college speech case after Tinker,
was Healy v. James,53 in which the Court reviewed the President of Cen-
tral Connecticut State College's (CCSC) denial of official recognition to a
local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The Presi-
dent's decision effectively precluded the student group from using any
campus facilities for its activities.54 In reviewing that action, the Court,
49. Id. at 508.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 511.
52. See generally supra note 3.
53. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
54. Id. at 176.
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as in Tinker, emphatically endorsed the first amendment rights of college
students. Justice Powell's majority opinion declared:
The precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.... The
college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the " 'market-
place of ideas,'" and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming
this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. 55
Given such a preamble, it is not surprising that the Court concluded that
the mere fact that the local SDS chapter was loosely affiliated with other
SDS branches involved in unlawful activities could not justify denying it
recognition.56 Similarly, the President's determination that the philoso-
phy of SDS was "abhorrent" to him and dedicated to "the destruction of
the very ideals and freedoms upon which ... academic life is founded"
did not permit the total banishment of SDS from campus life.5 7
The Court in Healy nevertheless went on to argue, citing Tinker,
that campus speech may be regulated under a functional compatibility
analysis. 58 Different locations, the Court recognized, warrant different
standards of review. In the general community, advocacy can only be
restricted if it crosses the line between protected and unprotected
speech. 9 "In the context of the 'special characteristics of the school en-
vironment,' " however, the Court explained that the government's power
to limit speech is more expansively defined.' At a public university, "as-
sociational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe upon rea-
sonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education."61 As in Tinker,
the Court did not detail what kinds of activities are actionable under this
standard, but it did favorably describe CCSC college regulations prohib-
iting student organizations from "invad[ing] the privacy of others" and
"interfer[ing] with the rights of others."62
In reliance on Healy, the Court in Papish v. Board of Curators of the
55. Id. at 180-81 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
56. Id. at 185-87.
57. Id. at 187.
58. Id. at 189.
59. Id. at 188. As an example, the Court pointed to speech that violates the standard of Bran.
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), by intentionally inciting lawless activity, as crossing the line
between protected and unprotected speech.
60. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community





University of Missouri 63 ordered the reinstatement of a student who had
been expelled from college for distributing a newspaper on campus that
included "indecent speech."" In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme
Court affirmed that "the mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how
offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off
in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.' "65 Although Papish con-
stitutes a strong condemnation of content discrimination by college
authorities, the decision is not fundamentally inconsistent with a func-
tional compatibility analysis. The charges against the expelled student
stated that the speech she published was generally improper-apparently
without regard to the place or manner of its distribution or its effect on
other students.66 In this context, "in the absence of any disruption of
campus order or interference with the rights of others," the university's
prohibition against indecent speech was held to be invalid and
unconstitutional.67
A final college speech case is Widmar v. Vincent,68 in which the Uni-
versity of Missouri refused to permit a group of Christian students to use
campus facilities for religious meetings and worship. The Court re-
viewed the university's content discriminatory regulation under strict
scrutiny and held it to be unconstitutional.69
By insisting that this particular content discriminatory regulation be
narrowly drawn and necessary to the furtherance of a compelling state
interest, however, the Court did not challenge the general applicability of
the functional compatibility standard of Tinker to the university environ-
ment. Indeed, Widmar repeatedly affirms Tinker's analysis. 70 Although
the Court acknowledged that "the campus of a public university, at least
for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum,"
it also recognized that:
[A] university differs in significant respects from public forums such as
streets or parks or even municipal theatres. A university's mission is educa-
tion, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority
to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use
63. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
64. Id. at 668-69. The use of the term "M- F--" as in "Up against the wall M- F--" in the
newspaper constituted a major part of the university's case against the petitioner.
65. Id. at 670.
66. Id. at 670-71 n.6.
67. Id.
68. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
69. Id. at 270, 277.




of its campus and facilities."1
The Court reviewed the University of Missouri's regulations in
Widmar under strict scrutiny rather than the Tinker functional compati-
bility standard because the university had created a forum that was gen-
erally open to over a hundred officially recognized student groups. By
opening its facilities to such a diverse constituency, the university was
obliged to satisfy stringent constitutional standards in order to deny ac-
cess to one group based solely on the content of its speech.72 The review
appropriate in Widmar, however, would not necessarily apply to all uni-
versity cases. As the majority acknowledged, its holding was "limited to
the context of a public forum created by the University itself."73
The purpose of discussing in detail the Court's analysis in these
cases is not to undermine their holdings, but to clarify their scope and
reasoning. Healy, Papish, and Widmar are limited decisions. They pro-
tect freedom of expression in the university environment in important
circumstances. They do not, however, involve situations in which the
authorities have even a colorable claim that student expression is disrup-
tive to the educational enterprise or that it impinges on the rights of
other students. If anything, the dicta in these opinions confirm that evi-
dence of such disruption or interference with the rights of others would
constitute an entirely different case.
B. Applying a Functional Compatibility Standard of Review to
University Activities-Disruptive Speech and Speech that
Impinges on the Rights of Others
If a functional compatibility standard of review controls speech reg-
ulations on college campuses, how is that standard to be implemented?
Clearly, something less than the general application of traditional public
forum rules is envisioned. Otherwise, the Court's focused attention on
"the special characteristics of the school environment" would be mean-
ingless.74 Similarly, it seems evident that school authorities may not ca-
priciously suppress unpopular or discomforting speech in its entirety.
On the other hand, administrators need not be limited to content-neutral,
71. Id. at 267-68 n.5.
72. Id. at 269-70. "In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on
the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must.., show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."
73. Id. at 276-77 n.20. The majority was responding to Justice Stevens' statement that not all
content discriminatory decisions of a university relating to student expression must receive such
exacting review. See id. at 277-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. See supra notes 60, 71 and accompanying text.
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time, place and manner regulations either. Beyond this point, there are
few specific guidelines. Although the Court has recognized "a univer-
sity's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate rea-
sonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of
other students to obtain an education,"75 there is no Supreme Court case
law dealing with the university environment which illustrates the type of
expressive activities that might be subject to discipline for impinging on
the rights and opportunities of other students to further their educational
goals.
The functional compatibility standard of review has been more ex-
plicitly applied to expressive activities in high schools after Tinker. In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,76 for example, a high school stu-
dent was suspended for using sexual metaphors in a school assembly
speech." Such high school cases, however, are arguably of limited rele-
vance in the university context because their reasoning is heavily influ-
enced by the immaturity of the high school audience and the "civilizing"
function of secondary education.7" In the university setting, students re-
quire less protection from offensive speech and the educational institu-
tion's mission is less involved with the inculcation of values.
Despite its different emphasis, the Fraser opinion is not entirely ir-
relevant to the university context. Justice Burger argued that one of the
functions of the public schools is to teach students "manners of civility"
and "consideration of the personal sensibilities of other[s]," even while
engaging in heated public debate.79 To enforce that lesson, speech that
will offend the personal sensibilities of other students may be regulated.
Justice Brennan concurred with the Court's conclusion that sanc-
tions may be imposed on a high school student who delivers a sexually
suggestive speech, but his reasons were more respectful of free speech
values than the majority's. The issue for Brennan was not so much
teaching students to be civil to their peers as it was maintaining a level of
discourse that allowed an educational interaction among students to oc-
cur. Having found Mr. Fraser's expression to be disruptive of the
school's educational program, school authorities could constitutionally
punish him. Thus, school officials may protect the personal sensibilities
of other students from offensive speech, not out of any sense of cultural
75. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
76. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 681-86.
79. Id. at 681.
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propriety, but because offensive speech interferes with and disrupts the
educational enterprise.80
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fraser helps lay the groundwork
for upholding some hate speech regulations on public university cam-
puses. Brennan's analysis is contextual. The hapless Mr. Fraser might
have been protected by the first amendment if he had given his speech in
other circumstances where the school's need to monitor the civility of his
discourse was less important to the success of its programs."' His expres-
sion was, however, inappropriate in the assembly in which it was deliv-
ered. Moreover, while Justice Brennan disputed the Court's conclusion
that Fraser's teenage audience was insulted by the language he used, he
did not challenge the majority's suggestion that insulting comments may
be prohibited in at least some situations.82 For Brennan, presumably,
insults might be sanctioned if they produced a disruptive effect. The is-
sue that remains open is whether these same arguments are applicable to
racist comments uttered on the campus of a public university.
C. Constitutionally Accepiable Restrictions on Racist Speech
Under the foregoing analysis, first amendment advocates who op-
pose any significant restriction of racist speech on college campuses must
make one of two arguments. They may argue that racist expression is
generally compatible with the uses to which property may legitimately be
put on a university campus, or, alternatively, they may argue that some
racist speech is functionally incompatible with some university activities,
but that there is no way to prohibit such speech without unacceptably
undermining academic and student freedom of expression.83
Neither of these arguments can be sustained. The first is simply
80. Id. at 687, 688-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 689. Justice Brennan gives no examples. Presumably lunch table conversation using
sexual metaphors would not subject a student speaker to discipline.
82. Id. at 689 n.2.
83. Judge Cohn's invalidation of the University of Michigan's racist speech regulations in Doe
v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), appears to be an example of the latter
argument. Although the court claimed to be mediating the conflicting values of free speech and
equality, no real balancing occurred. Instead, Judge Cohn concluded that "[w]hile the Court is
sympathetic to the University's obligation to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its
students, such efforts must not be at the expense of free speech." Id. at 868. Similarly, although the
court summarily recognized that hate speech could be regulated if it constituted "fighting words,"
met the criteria for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, or created a
hostile or abusive working environment (prohibited by Title VII), id. at 862-63, it nonetheless found
the University's use of terms such as "stigmatize," "victimize," and "threat to an individual's aca-
demic efforts," hopelessly vague and overbroad. id. at 864-67. Why these terms should be held to
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wrong. The second has more merit, but tells only half the story. One
can easily imagine worst-case scenarios in which well-intentioned regula-
tions of racist speech are abused by administrators to stifle the kind of
"robust" debate and inquiry that are essential to the fulfillment of a uni-
versity's research and educational objectives. However, one can also im-
agine equally unacceptable scenarios in which racist expression renders a
university environment uninhabitable (or at least educationally useless)
for minority group members. In short, a comparison of worst case scena-
rios filled with precarious slides down concededly slippery slopes does
not prove the first amendment advocate's case. Rather, it demonstrates
that absolutist approaches to this problem are untenable and that the
tough and risky business of careful balancing and line-drawing is
unavoidable.
An analysis of the first argument helps to illustrate some of the
problems with the second point as well. Is racist speech ever functionally
incompatible with the uses to which property is put on a public univer-
sity campus? It clearly is in certain circumstances. Assume a law profes-
sor is teaching a seminar in which the students are expected to actively
participate in the discussion of important cases. There are ten white stu-
dents and two black students in the seminar. Several of the white stu-
dents regularly and repeatedly refer to the black students as "dumb
nrs" and address them directly in the same manner, by saying "Listen
nrs" as a preface to their statements. As the administrator of the semi-
nar discussion, does the professor violate the first amendment by inter-
ceding and informing the student speakers that continued use of such
epithets will result in their being excluded from the seminar? There can
be little doubt that the use of these epithets in this context unreasonably
disrupts the tenor of the seminar and impinges on the black students'
give less notice and to be less precise than the constitutional, common law, and statutory standards
the court implicitly approved was never explained.
The examples cited by the court to demonstrate the unacceptable scope of the University's policy
are also unpersuasive. A graduate student in social work was challenged for saying that he thought
homosexuality was a disease and that he had been counseling several of his gay clients accordingly.
The court strongly disapproved of this application of the University's policy and questioned whether
statements "made in the course of academic discussion and research" can ever be called into ques-
tion and subjected to sanctions despite the "innocent intent of the speaker." Id. at 865-66. One
wonders if the court would have thought differently had the graduate student described being Jewish
or Mormon as examples of a religious psychosis, of which he was "curing" his clients, or if he
claimed to be treating racial minorities for the delusion that they were as good as white people. The
court's apparent tolerance of the recitation of an "allegedly homophobic limerick" in a public speak-
ing class, id. at 865, raises similar issues and analogies. There are many words that rhyme with
vulgar ethnic epithets.
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right to participate in this educational experience. Does even the most
ardent first amendment advocate insist that this pattern of expression in
this circumstance must be tolerated?84
Suppose we alter the hypothetical so that it is the professor rather
than the students who uses racist epithets in addressing minority stu-
dents and pejorative language in describing their attributes. Surely that
does not make the speech in question more consistent with the univer-
sity's educational mission. We can also change the location of events. A
campus dormitory houses nineteen white students and one Hispanic stu-
dent. The walls in the corridors are covered with vulgar racist posters,
and the Hispanic student is targeted with hate mail and racist messages
stuck to his door or slipped under it. Entering and leaving his room
involves running a gauntlet of epithets. Can it seriously be proposed that
all of these expressive activities are compatible with the residential envi-
ronment the university seeks to provide its out-of-town students?
Most readers would presumably agree that at least some of the
events described above are unacceptable. The more difficult question is
whether such events are capable of being regulated in a manner that does
not open the door for any individual whose sensibilities are offended by a
statement with which he or she disagrees, to seek administrative protec-
tion against the offending expression. Free speech advocates correctly
recognize that speech regulations are intrinsically dangerous, that they
are not easily constrained, and that they inevitably require the exercise of
discretion by officials who cannot be trusted. When speech regulations
84. One response to this hypothetical is that the incident described involves constitutionally
unprotected "fighting words." Therefore, first amendment proponents could support regulating
such expression without also endorsing a functional incompatibility analysis. This argument is not
persuasive for several reasons. Not only has the "fighting words" exception to the first amendment
been narrowed almost to oblivion, see supra note 8, but it technically applies only to those situations
in which the victim of hate speech is likely to respond violently to the speaker's verbal assault. See
K. GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 292-301. The hypothetical in the text is intended to also include
situations in which hate speech hurts, disorients, and intimidates its victim, but is unlikely to pro-
voke physical retaliation. Such circumstances would justify the regulation of speech under a func-
tional incompatibility analysis, but not under the "fighting words" doctrine.
In addition, the "in your face" proximity and vulgarity associated with "fighting words" provides
a narrower framework for regulation than the text suggests. The speaker using hate speech may be
on the other side of the classroom from his victims and may address his remarks to the entire
seminar group. Furthermore, his message may avoid the use of recognized epithets. Still, if a stu-
dent in an English composition seminar presents a paper extolling the mass murder of Jewish chil-
dren during the Holocaust, one can hardly expect Jewish participants to fulfill the traditional role of
seminar members and critique the organization and persuasiveness of that essay. The reading of
such a paper may not constitute "fighting words," but it will fundamentally distort the educational
purpose of the seminar.
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are at issue, we have truly met the enemy, and he is us.8 5 Well inten-
tioned foes of bigotry and racial discrimination are no more reliable
monitors of hurtful speech than anyone else.
It should be remembered, however, that a functional compatibility
standard of review is not a deferential one. It does not support the sup-
pression of speech based on the "undifferentiated fear" of disturbance 6
or abstract "common sense" generalities. 7 Speech regulations must be
more than simply reasonable; they must meet a real need. Moreover, a
functional compatibility analysis of speech regulations is not completely
open-ended. It does not suggest that any expression that some student
finds unsettling or offensive may be banned. The concept is relative. The
standard requires a combined examination of what the various functions
of a university are, and how particular expression interferes with these
functions. For speech to be restricted, the challenged expression must do
far more than provoke an intense desire to rebut the speaker's comments.
That need can be accommodated without preventing speech from occur-
ring. Indeed, one of the university's purposes is to facilitate just that
kind of spirited debate.
Ultimately, some concerns about overregulation may be reduced by
clear statements from the Supreme Court emphasizing that the function
of the university includes directly challenging accepted assumptions
about what is empirically accurate or normatively correct. Disturbing
speech must be tolerated if it is appropriately directed to the furtherance
of an intellectual inquiry. A heavy presumption of compatibility between
the expression of ideas to be tested and evaluated and a university's basic
nature must be accepted as the foundation of this standard of review.
The most vulgar examples of hate speech directed at minorities for
the purpose of harassment probably do not fall within this presumption.
There is no serious issue to debate if someone calls you a "Jew bastard"
to your face. Other hurtful expression, however, requires more careful
analysis. Statements that black people or Hispanics or Jews have genetic
predispositions involving negative character traits are in theory, at least,
verifiable propositions with social policy ramifications. Their incompati-
bility with the university's mission is much harder to evaluate. How
courts or administrators would or should treat such statements within a
85. W. KELLY, IMPOLLUTABLE POGO 128 (1970).
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
87. See supra note 21.
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functional compatibility framework can be honestly debated. 88  Cer-
tainly, the issue cannot easily be resolved in the abstract. It is unlikely
that statements propounding the genetic inferiority of racial minorities
can be completely excised from a university campus. It is equally un-
likely, however, that a true-false examination in Sociology 101 should be
allowed if it presents the statement "[t]he white race and culture is supe-
rior to other racial groups," and only scores "true" as the correct answer.
Thus, a functional compatibility analysis may be unavoidable in one
sense, but, standing alone, it provides a dangerous basis for determining
the degree of regulatory discretion available to public university adminis-
trators. Fortunately, however, the situation is not so bleak. Although
there are no totally safe havens, and no immunity from chilling effects
and administrative discretion, that does not mean that there are no famil-
iar and limited doctrinal plateaus on which speech regulations can be
grounded without throwing caution to the wind. Part II examines the
regulation of hate speech in particular circumstances in which the regula-
tion of expression has been historically recognized and effectively re-
strained. It presents a more constrained functional compatibility
framework which may be used to identify speech that the Constitution
itself condemns as incompatible with the function of a public university.
88. I do not contend that such speech should necessarily be subject to sanction under a func-
tional compatibility standard of review, but I also do not think that the issue is a simple one.
Matsuda discusses this problem far too briefly. At the professorial level, she suggests that "poorly
documented, racially biased work" may properly be denied an academic forum because it fails to
meet neutral standards of merit. However, she adds that such expression should not be prohibited, it
should be subject instead to the rigor of open debate and challenged directly. Public Response, supra
note 5, at 2364-65. Unfortunately, social science generalizations and theories may be sufficiently
indeterminate on enough controversial subjects that a wide variety of hate-inspiring premises may be
presented as worthy of legitimate consideration. Moreover, in the hierarchical system of education
that exists in most universities, a presumption of truth extends to the professor's analysis, but not
that of his student challenger. While other professors might take issue with the racist views of their
colleague, how do they reach the audience of his or her class to present their contrary analysis?
Even worse is a situation where a majority of professors in a department share racist beliefs.
Much of the discussion of racist speech in academia seems to presuppose that racism is and
always will be a minority position there. If that turns out to be an erroneous assumption, will the




II. MAKING FREE SPEECH AND EQUALITY COMPATIBLE:
REGULATING HATE SPEECH TO GUARANTEE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
A. State Action
Professors at state universities are state actors performing official
functions, and, as such, are subject to the constitutional constraints im-
posed by the fourteenth amendment.8 9 Thus, one way to legitimate as
well as to control restrictions on the expression of academic personnel is
to prohibit speech in college classrooms that violates constitutional limi-
tations on government speech.
The doctrinal foundation for regulating hate speech under this anal-
ysis is the argument that the equal protection clause prohibits the state
from preaching racial invective or the supremacy of one race over an-
other. Brown v. Board of Education holds that "separate but equal"
school facilities are unconstitutional because they communicate messages
of inferiority to black children.90 By analogy, the state is also forbidden
from causing the same stigmatic consequences that segregation produces
by disseminating messages of racial inferiority directly through govern-
ment speech. The protection provided the "hearts and minds" of minor-
ity students should apply with equal force in both situations. 91
The extent of this equal protection prohibition remains to be deter-
mined. It is one thing to argue that professors may be prevented from
cursing their students with racial epithets; it is something else to suggest
that any discussion of differences between racial groups that casts an
unfavorable light on a racial minority is unconstitutional. Are Dr.
Shockley's statements about the intelligence of black people to be barred
from academic consideration by judges enforcing the equal protection
clause?92
89. While "there are some constitutional prohibitions that the acts of individual government
officials cannot in isolation violate," L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1704, there seems little doubt that a
single state official can violate equal protection and first amendment rights. See generally Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (school principal and teachers); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d I (1st
Cir. 1978) (social workers, physicians); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978) (univer-
sity administrator); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975) (university administrator).
90. "To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494
(1954).
91. See Heavenly and Earthly Spheres, supra note 1, at 150.
92. See Public Response, supra note 5, at 2364-65 (citing Lacayo, A Theory Goes on Trial, TIME,
Sept. 24, 1984, at 62). See generally Big Brother, supra note 6, at 127; Note, Group Vilification
Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.L 308 (1978).
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The problem is a serious one, but it is roughly comparable to other
constitutional constraints on government speech that civil liberty groups
routinely accept with equanimity. If a professor insisted on beginning
each class with a sectarian prayer, which he led students in reciting, his
expression would be immediately (and successfully) challenged as violat-
ing the establishment clause.13 A similar constitutional violation would
arise if a professor pronounced a particular faith to be the one true reli-
gion, or insisted that students who were not baptized would burn in hell
for eternity.94 It is clear, however, that, despite these restrictions,
religion may be regularly discussed in college history, philosophy and
literature classes.95 The establishment clause may on occasion limit ex-
pression in these classes,96 but the line drawing it requires has not dis-
abled the academic community to the point that civil libertarians
challenge its application as an unacceptable assault on academic
93. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (striking down teacher-led school prayers). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting in striking down moment of silence statute that the unconstitu-
tional "message of endorsement [of religion] would seem inescapable if the teacher exhorts children
to use the designated time to pray").
94. There is language in Supreme Court opinions suggesting that the establishment clause analy-
sis of colleges and public high schools may vary in certain respects because public school students
are more impressionable and school authorities exercise greater coercive power in that context. See,
eg., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 n.5 (1987); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14
(1981). These distinctions, however, clearly do not justify the direct endorsement of religious doc-
trine by professors. Widmar itself establishes that point. There would be little reason for the Court
to argue that a public forum in which religious groups participate does not violate the establishment
clause because "by creating a forum the University does not thereby endorse or promote any of the
particular ideas aired there," Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72 n.10, if university professors did not vio-
late the establishment clause by teaching their students the tenets of the "one true faith" in the
classroom.
See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1971) (upholding federal construction grants
to church-related colleges, despite establishment clause concerns, because of statutory restrictions
prohibiting the funds from being used for religious instruction, training, or worship).
95. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) ("[TIhe Bible may constitutionally be used in
an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like" in a school
curriculum, but not to endorse a religious faith.); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 606-08 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
96. "Of course, the 'academic freedom' of teachers to present information in public schools, and
students to receive it, is broad. But it necessarily is circumscribed by the establishment clause."
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., concurring). "Whatever the academic merit of particular
subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of state officials to pick and
choose among them for the purpose of promoting a particular religious belief." Id. at 604. See also
Developments in the Law--Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. Rv. 1045, 1052 (1968) ("[Ain affirma-
tive requirement that the inferiority of a racial group be taught.., would violate the equal protec-
tion clause. Similarly, the teaching of religious ethics, dogma, or ritual would probably violate the
establishment clause of the first amendment.").
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freedom.97
The establishment clause analogy to equal protection principles is
particularly apt for several reasons. It persuasively suggests that certain
prohibitions on government speech are worth enforcing even though
their implementation is necessarily imprecise and will leave speakers with
considerable uncertainty as to the boundaries within which they must
operate. Moreover, the establishment clause's mandate serves many of
the same functions as the equal protection clause. Its purpose, as both
case law and commentary recognize, is to protect the sensibilities and
civil status of the members of minority faiths." Given that constitu-
tional mission, it is difficult to understand why prohibiting the state's
endorsement of a majority religion trumps first amendment concerns
while government promotion of the supremacy of a majority race must
be tolerated in the name of first amendment values. Finally, despite the
general uncertainty that exists as to their exact parameters, both of these
constitutional provisions protect core concerns that may be readily dis-
tinguishable from a host of other subjects.
Only a narrow class of expression, a small subset of the much larger
category of controversial and offensive speech that might arise in a.uni-
versity setting, may be constrained under this analysis. No one would
suggest, for example, that a defense of flag burning in a constitutional law
class, which offended the sensibilities of several participants, could in any
way transgress equal protection clause or establishment clause require-
ments. Only speech stigmatizing members of a suspect class99 or under-
mining the civil status of religious groups could even arguably be subject
to regulation under the analysis proposed here.
B. Attenuated State Action-Symbiotic Relationships, Endorsements
and Imprimaturs
1. Equal Protection: Symbiotic Relationships. State action for con-
stitutional purposes is not limited to official acts by state employees. In a
97. See generally Brief of Petitioners, Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (Amicus Curiae by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et.
al.) [hereinafter Westside Community Schools Brief]; Brief for Respondents, County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) [hereinafter County of Allegheny Brief].
98. See Heavenly and Earthly Spheres, supra note 1, at 134-37.
99. Under the proposed analysis, stigmatizing the members of a suspect class refers to expres-
sion that communicates a message of disfavored status similar to that which Brown v. Board of
Education condemns because of its invidious effect on the listener's self esteem. Not all speech that
may produce a stigmatizing effect can necessarily be prohibited, however. That will depend on the
circumstances. The point of the text is that only speech of this kind may be restricted under the
equal protection analysis proposed.
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variety of circumstances, the conduct of private individuals is found to be
imbued with state action and therefore subject to the discipline of the
fourteenth amendment." 0 Because of the inconsistent and analytically
obscure state of the case law, it is difficult to predict when private con-
duct will be held to constitute state action.' Thus, the discussion that
follows must be based in part on assumption and analogy. This uncer-
tainty need not be a serious concern for the purposes of this article, how-
ever. The article's goal is to fight the battle over regulating racist speech
on liberal turf-on the basis of assumptions and principles that are con-
sistent with a civil libertarian-oriented constitutional framework. That
objective can provide critical background and direction for the analysis
of state action which follows.
Initially, it is necessary to confront the lack of uniform interpreta-
tions as to what constitutes state action along a continuum of possible
constitutional claims. A court may find private conduct to be state ac-
tion in a case involving an equal protection challenge to racial discrimi-
nation, while the same private institutional defendant would not be a
state actor if it was accused of violating someone's procedural due pro-
cess rights.
For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,0'2 a pri-
vate lessee who operated a restaurant in a municipal parking garage fly-
ing the state flag was held to violate the equal protection clause because it
refused to serve black customers. The mutual interdependence and
symbiotic relationship between the state lessor and private lessee pierced
the state action veil and rendered the restaurant's discriminatory service
policies vulnerable to constitutional challenge.103 Suppose, however, that
the restaurant was accused, not of operating a segregated facility, but
rather of failing to give an employee a due process hearing prior to his
dismissal. It is far less likely that state action would be found in this
latter circumstance. 04
100. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1701, 1705-11.
101. See Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Ac-
tion" Requirement, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 221 (1976) [hereinafter "State Action" Requirement].
102. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
103. Id. at 724-25.
104. See "State Action" Requirement, supra note 101, at 226-27. This lack of uniformity is
generally recognized. As Tribe notes, the Court's determination as to whether state action exists is
often more properly understood to be "a decision about the substantive reach of specific constitu-
tional commands rather than a decision about whether the government has done anything to which
the Constitution speaks." L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1720. Similarly, Justice Marshall argued in his
dissent in Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 365 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting), that
state action may be defined narrowly "[i]n the due process area" in order to promote values of
[Vol. 39
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Because Burton has been ignored or distinguished by recent
Supreme Court decisions, one is tempted to conclude that it has been
implicitly overruled."' 5 However, these current cases rarely deal with
racial discrimination and equal protection violations because private dis-
crimination is now routinely prohibited by statutory law.'0 6  It is no
longer necessary to use the Constitution to prohibit private discrimina-
tion. That does not mean, however, that it was a mistake to do so. From
the perspective of conventional civil liberties values, Burton should be
good law. At a minimum, it should continue to be sound precedent as
long as its scope is limited to the race discrimination context.1
0 7
The general inferences that may be drawn from Burton for the regu-
pluralism and diversity "by allowing various private institutions the flexibility to select procedures
that fit their particular needs." Id. at 372. Allowing those same private institutions to practice racial
discrimination in the services they provide, however, would violate the much broader constitutional
mandate imposed by the equal protection clause. Id. at 374.
See also Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting the double stan-
dard which finds state action more readily in race discrimination cases than when other constitu-
tional claims are evaluated); Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to
PrivateActivity, 74 COLuM. L. Rv. 656, 657, 661 (1974) (concluding that courts seem less willing to
find state action when a constitutional claim other than discrimination is raised)[hereinafter State
Action].
105. See, eg., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987) (ignoring Burton despite facts suggesting interdependence between state and private en-
tity); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011
(1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-59 (1974) (all distinguishing Burton).
106. See, eg., W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, THE AMERICAN CONSTrurION,
1047 (5th ed. 1981) (past two decades of civil rights legislation have mooted state action issue regard-
ing private racial discrimination); State Action, supra note 104, at 658 (equal protection cases mo-
nopolized state action area in the past; now state action issue arises more commonly with regard to
other constitutional claims).
107. Burton has never been formally overruled. More importantly, if statutory prohibitions
against racial discrimination in places of public accommodations were repealed in some nightmare
future time, the grounds for finding state action in a Burton-type situation would continue to be
valid. In light of the protection provided by civil rights statutes today, it is easy to forget the power
and passion of the arguments for an expansive interpretation of state action that were heard twenty
years ago. See Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
Of course, one can only speculate whether the Court's narrowing of state action doctrine in proce-
dural due process cases would actually be repudiated in race discrimination cases should the need
arise to reaffirm cases like Burton or Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants violates equal protection clause). In light of the Court's
commitment to limiting the scope of constitutional rights, see generally Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43 (1989), it is possi-
ble that the way state action is defined in procedural due process cases will control the application of
the fourteenth amendment for all constitutional claims, even core equal protection cases. See also
Rowe, The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEo. L.J. 745, 766-67 (1981) (arguing that the Court's cases
preclude a balancing or double standard approach to state action issue). On the other hand, the due
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lation of hate speech on public university campuses are powerful ones.
The first is that there should be a greater willingness to find state action
where private racist activities are challenged as violating equal protection
principles.1"8 Equal protection cases rank at or near the top of the con-
stitutional hierarchy in this regard. The second is that in situations
where the state and private actors demonstrate substantial interdepen-
dence in their interests, state action may be identified, and discriminatory
conduct prohibited. While interdependence and symbiotic relationships
hardly constitute precise criteria for finding state action, a Burton-type
analysis might, for example, justify finding racist speech by a university's
student association or school newspaper to be state action in violation of
equal protection guarantees.10 9
2. Establishment Clause: State Endorsements. An even more per-
suasive state action analogy for the regulation of hate speech may be
drawn from establishment clause cases. 10 Permitting private expressive
displays involving religious symbols on public property violates the es-
tablishment clause if doing so has "the purpose or effect of 'endorsing'
religion." 1  Thus, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,112 the placement by
a Roman Catholic group, the Holy Name Society, of a Christmas creche
in a county courthouse for the 45-day Christmas season was held to be an
unconstitutional endorsement of Christian doctrine and a violation of the
establishment clause.
13
process cases paint such a truncated picture of state action that it is hard to believe that even the
current Court would enforce these holdings across the board.
108. See infra note 149 for state action articles endorsing an increased willingness to find state
action in equal protection cases involving racial discrimination. Lower court cases suggesting simi-
lar conclusions are listed in 2 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, POLITICAL AND
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 405-06 (9th ed. 1979).
109. If the student association barred black students from running for student office or if the
student newspaper refused to hire black students as editors, a finding of state action would presuma-
bly raise few objections. See generally Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d
1344, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989) (Student Government Association is a state actor for constitutional
purposes). State action would also be found if the school paper regularly proclaimed a particular
religious faith to be the one true religion. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. The argu-
ment for treating racist speech by the student government or newspaper as state action is analogous.
110. This is not to suggest that Burton has no bearing on the question of state action in estab-
lishment clause cases. It remains available as an independent basis for finding state action under
either the equal protection clause or the establishment clause. See, e.g., ACLU of Georgia v. Rabun
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1109 (1Ith Cir. 1983) (state involvement with
placing of private cross in state park sufficient to find state action under Burton).
111. County of Allegheny v. ACLU (Greater Pittsburgh Chapter), 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100 (1989).
112. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
113. Id. at 3093.
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This "endorsement" test of the establishment clause has close paral-
lels to the equal protection mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.1 14
The establishment clause prohibits government from promoting or favor-
ing one religious denomination over another. The state may not send "a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community."' 15 Simi-
larly, under Brown, the state may not communicate a message of racial
supremacy to the majority or racial inferiority to minorities.1 16
This constitutional equivalence has important ramifications for the
regulation of hate speech on public university campuses. Under contem-
porary case law, private religious expression on public property violates
the Constitution if it suggests that the state endorses the majority Chris-
tian faith.I17 Why then should private expression on public property im-
plying state support for white supremacy be any less repugnant to
constitutional principles? Civil liberties groups have demonstrated a sig-
nificant willingness to subordinate private free speech interests to estab-
lishment clause concerns in a variety of circumstances. Constitutional
challenges have been raised to prevent extra-curricular religious clubs
from being allowed to meet in public high schools and to prohibit pri-
vately owned religious symbols from being displayed on public property
even when such property is generally open to expressive activities.'
18
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
116. See Heavenly and Earthly Spheres, supra note 1, at 150.
117. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3105 (1989) (privately owned
creche display in county courthouse during Christmas season violates establishment clause); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (posting privately funded copies of Ten Commandments in public
school violates establishment clause); Smith v. County of Albemarle, Virginia, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir.
1990) (placement by local Jaycees of nativity scene on front lawn of county office building violates
establishment clause); American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987)
(nativity scene built by private individuals located in city hall violates establishment clause); ACLU
of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (1lth Cir. 1983) (privately
funded cross placed in state park violates establishment clause). See generally Kaplan v. City of
Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990) (placing menorah
display belonging to Jewish organization in park in front of city hall violates establishment clause).
Of course, not every private religious display permitted on public property violates the establish-
ment clause. However, the controlling question is whether the challenged display constitutes a pro-
hibited endorsement of religion, not whether the establishment clause applies to private expression.
See, eg., McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984); Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal.
App. 3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (2d Dist. 1989).
118. The American Civil Liberties Union, for example, certainly a quintessential proponent of
free speech guarantees, has defended establishment clause principles against freedom of speech de-
fenses on numerous occasions. See, eg., Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v.
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The argument for a parallel constitutional hierarchy elevating equal pro-
tection concerns over the public dissemination of private racist speech, in
those situations where state endorsement of the racist message may be
implied, has substantial bite to it and cannot easily be dismissed. 1 9 At a
minimum, free speech advocates who would constitutionally limit reli-
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (ACLU joins amicus brief urging that recognition and sponsorship
of religious clubs in public high school violates establishment clause); County ofAllegheny, 109 S. Ct.
at 3097 (Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the ACLU brings direct challenge to private religious dis-
plays in county courthouse and in front of city-county building); Kaplan, 891 F.2d 1024 (ACLU
Foundation of Vermont is of counsel in suit challenging placement of private menorah in park in
front of city hall); Okrand, 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (ACLU represents plaintiff,
corporate director and former legal director of ACLU, in challenge to display of privately owned
menorah in city hall rotunda regularly used to showcase expressive exhibits).
This is not to suggest that the ACLU or any of its chapters or affiliates would necessarily endorse
the regulation of racist speech on college campuses. The national organization opposes such regula-
tions, although it is studying the question, and many state affiliates are torn by the issue. L. A. Daily
J., July 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5. Indeed, the amicus brief joined by the ACLU in Westside Community
Schools, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990), vigorously distinguishes the high school and college context in
urging that the recognition of student religious clubs is much more threatening to establishment
clause principles in the former circumstance than the latter. See Westside Community Schools Brief,
supra note 97, at 19-24.
On the other hand, the ACLU's arguments in its brief in County ofAllegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086, are
directly analogous to the contentions minority group members might raise to challenge racist speech
at a university. The ACLU argued that the creche and menorah displays at issue violated the estab-
lishment clause despite their private sponsorship, County of Allegheny Brief, supra note 97 at 26,
because the context in which these religious expressions occurred communicated a message of state
endorsement, id. at 10-11, 15-17, which offended the sensibilities of members of minority religions,
id. at 7, 24-25. The ACLU rejected their opponents' argument that the religious displays constituted
protected expression, and that first amendment rights outweighed establishment clause concerns in
this situation, on the grounds that neither of the locations where the religious symbols were dis-
played was a public forum. The creche was displayed on the Grand Staircase of the county court-
house, and the menorah was placed just outside the city-county building next to the city's Christmas
tree. Although parts of the county courthouse had been used on occasion for expressive displays, the
ACLU supported its contentions by characterizing the county courthouse and city-county hall loca-
tions as nonpublic forums, citing recent Supreme Court decisions sharply restricting free speech
rights on public property. Id. at 42-47 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
119. Justice Marshall's concurrence in Westside Community Schools, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2378
(1990) (Marshall, J., concurring) clearly demonstrates the willingness of liberal Justices to
subordinate free speech interests to establishment clause concerns. Marshall explained:
mhe Constitution requires toleration of speech over its suppression ... in our Nation's
schools.
But the Constitution also demands that the State not take action that has the primary
effect of advancing religion. The introduction of religious speech into the public schools
reveals the tension between these two constitutional commitments, because the failure of
a school to stand apart from religious speech can convey a message that the school
endorses rather than merely tolerates that speech.... If public schools are perceived as
conferring the imprimatur of the State on religious doctrine or practice as a result of
such a policy, the nominally "neutral" character of the policy will not save it from run-
ning afoul of the Establishment Clause.
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gious speech more rigorously than racist speech bear the burden of justi-
flying this distinction.
If the establishment of racial supremacy and religious orthodoxy are
comparably prohibited by the Constitution, the regulation of some racist
speech on public university campuses is not only constitutionally permis-
sible, it is constitutionally mandated. Determining which speech consti-
tutes a prohibited message of endorsement or disfavored status will not
be easily accomplished, however, and that doctrinal difficulty will have
significant, negative implications. Uncertainty as to what speech must be
prohibited risks the serious consequence of chilling speech that deserves
to be protected. However, since this uncertainty is clearly tolerated in
the grey area separating the establishment of religion from legitimate free
speech and free exercise claims, it cannot constitute a per se unacceptable
burden on speech that arguably conflicts with equal protection
principles. 120
Although this article does not purport to develop an acceptable set
of guidelines that a public university administrator might adopt to regu-
late hate speech in a constitutionally permissible manner, it is important
to recognize that the line drawing problems that administrators must
confront do not exist in an analytic vacuum. Establishment clause case
law provides significant information as to how equal protection and first
amendment conflicts should be resolved.
It is clear, for example, that the context in which the contested ex-
pression occurs will be controlling. 2' Certain locations are particularly
problematic because of the function they serve or the attention they
attract.1 22 In these areas, "[n]o viewer could reasonably think that [ex-
Id. at 2379 (citations omitted).
The same constitutional tension exists between first amendment and equal protection commit-
ments. It should be resolved under a similar analysis.
120. In arguing in support of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test for the establishment clause
in County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086, the ACLU candidly conceded "that the case-by-case analy-
sis contemplated by Lynch [v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)] lacks a certain precision .... County
of Allegheny Brief, supra note 97, at 20. However, "[slurely the attraction of a 'bright line' test
should not be used to overcome those prohibitions on government so carefully imposed by the fram-
ers." Id. at 46.
121. See, eg., Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 565 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, Smith v.
County of Albemarle, Virginia, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990) (examining "nature, size, location, and
duration of the [religious] display, and its relation to the symbolic center of government" to deter-
mine if private religious speech on public property violates establishment clause).
122. See, eg., County ofAlbemarle, 895 F.2d at 955 (Private creche "displayed in the context of
a government site" violates establishment clause since creche could not be viewed "without also
viewing the trappings and identifying marks of the state."); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d
1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (Private display of "an unattended, solitary religious symbol [a menorah]
1991]
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pression occurred]... without the support and approval of the govern-
ment." 123 Thus, racist posters hung in the foyer of an administration
building create a different impression than a poster or a bulletin board on
the basement wall of the student union.124
Time is also a critical variable. A single short-term event, whether it
be the singing of Christmas carols or the holding of a racist political
rally, is much less likely to communicate a message of state approval
than is a display or poster set in a prominent location for several
weeks. 125 Although the time factor, like location, may be of controlling
in City Hall Park, given that Park's close association with the seat of government," violates estab-
lishment clause notwithstanding the park's general status as traditional public forum.); ACLU v.
County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655, 662 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (factor
in determining that private menorah and creche display violate establishment clause is that "each
display was located at or in a public building devoted to core functions of government and each was
placed at a prominent site at the public building where visitors would see it"); American Jewish
Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Because City Hall is so plainly
under government ownership and control, every display and activity in the building is implicitly
marked with the stamp of government approval."). But see Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal.
App. 3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (2d Dist. 1989) (Display of historical artifact, a menorah, in city
hall rotunda, the site of a wide variety of historical, cultural, and artistic exhibits, does not violate
establishment clause.).
As the ACLU stated in its brief in County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. 3086, "to suggest that changes
in setting have no impact on the message carried by a display is simply to shut ones [sic] eyes to
matters of common experience." County of Allegheny Brief, supra note 97, at 16.
123. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104 (referring to the location of the creche as in "the
'main' and 'most beautiful part' of the building that is the seat of county government").
The endorsement effect of expression in these central locations is not dissipated by the fact that
the state permits selective access to the area for displays and promotions. "Even if the Grand Stair-
case (the site of the creche) occasionally was used for displays other than the creche, ... it remains
true that any display located there fairly may be understood to express views that receive the support
and endorsement of the government." Id. at 3104 n.50.
124. See Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625,630 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985) (Transfer of sexually explicit and racially offensive art works from main
building gallery to less conspicuous location did not violate first amendment because "[t]he first-floor
gallery in Prairie State College's main building is a place of great prominence and visibility, implying
college approval rather than just custody....").
125. Time enters into the constitutional analysis in three distinct respects. First, it is an impor-
tant factor to consider in determining whether the state can be objectively understood to approve,
ratify or endorse private expression on public property. Even under Justice Kennedy's extremely
lenient establishment clause test that only prohibits coercive action by the state, the duration of
symbolic expression of a religious faith on state property is a significant variable. Thus, Kennedy
concedes that the Constitution "forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross
on the roof of city hail... because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the
government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion."
County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3137 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Second, the lengthy period of time during which a poster or display is exhibited may undermine
the state's defense that the challenged expression occurs in a public forum, and, therefore, is not the
government's responsibility. Opening a location for brief expressive events cannot immunize the
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significance in some cases, (a permanent expressive display is probably
the best example), it is more generally only one of many factors to be
evaluated in the ad hoe balancing that the resolution of these issues
requires.126
The identification of the private source of speech is also a relevant,
though not dispositive, factor. That the creche held unconstitutional in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU bore a sign identifying its private owner-
ship did not save it from violating the establishment clause. Such signs
may simply demonstrate "that the government is endorsing the religious
[or racist] message of that organization, rather than communicating a
message of its own." '12 7 On the other hand, the prominent disclaimer of
state approval for the message being conveyed is certainly a factor to
consider in determining whether the state will be perceived as endorsing
a hate group's invidious communication.1 28
Finally, a message of endorsement is less likely to occur in public
forums or areas designated to serve as an open site for unrestricted ex-
pression. Although problems may arise as to the location of such fo-
rums,1 29 the case law holds that an establishment clause violation does
government from the likely association between state and speaker that viewers will infer from idio-
syncratic long-term displays which are only occasionally permitted at the same site. See, e.g.,
County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3104 n.50; Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1026.
Third, long-term displays magnify the problematic effects of speech on public property for minor-
ity group members who desire to use the property for its intended purpose. If a group is allowed to
hold an afternoon rally in a public park, those persons whose sensibilities are offended by the
speaker's message are only temporarily burdened in their ability to enjoy that facility. Extended
exhibits, on the other hand, may make public property generally inaccessible to those for whom the
challenged expression is intolerable. See, eg., ACLU of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of
Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1108 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs testified that because of the pres-
ence of large lighted cross in state park, they did not camp there for years).
126. See, eg., County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d at 955 (display of creche for a five-week period is
one factor in finding establishment clause violation).
127. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3105. See also County ofAlbemarle, 895 F.2d at 958 ("It
remains to be seen whether any disclaimer can eliminate the patent aura of government endorsement
of religion."); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1029 n.5 ("Even if [religious] display had been accompanied by an
express disclaimer of City sponsorship and approval, the pervasive message of government endorse-
ment communicated by [the context of display] would not be negated."); American Jewish Congress
v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (7th Cir. 1987) (Despite six disclaimer signs on religious
display, "the message of government endorsement generated by [the] display was too pervasive to be
mitigated by the presence of disclaimers.").
128. See, eg., Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356,
2372-73 (1990) (school recognition of religious club will not constitute prohibited endorsement of
religion if school effectively disclaims such an intent); ACLU v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098, 1103-04
(6th Cir. 1990); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided
Court sub. nom., Board of Trustees of the Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985);
Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
129. See, eg., County ofAlbemarle, 895 F.2d at 959 n.7 (that location of private creche is classi-
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not typically occur if religious expression is given equal access to an open
forum in which diverse groups regularly participate. 13' Again, the same
analysis should apply to speakers communicating a racist message. 131
3. First Amendment: Imprimaturs. A final restriction on private
speech tracks an endorsement analysis, but from a different and more
problematic perspective. The government may obviously regulate the ex-
pression of state employees, not because it is constitutionally required to
do so, but because doing so furthers the objectives the employees were
hired to achieve. 132 Without regard to equal protection requirements, no
one would dispute the power of a public university administrator to im-
pose sanctions on a vocational counselor who insisted on advising black
students that they should seek less competitive employment opportuni-
ties because they are genetically inferior to white applicants. A state's
commitment to antidiscrimination policies is itself sufficient justification
to permit the disciplining of employees whose expression in the perform-
ance of their duties interferes with the furtherance of the government's
equal opportunity objectives.1 33
fled as a traditional or designated public forum does not preclude establishment clause violation as
long as display conveys state endorsement of religion); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1029-30 (even if park in
front of city hall is public forum, long-term religious display located there still violates establishment
clause). See supra notes 122-24; see infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
130. See, eg., Westside Community Schools, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263.(1981); McCreary, 739 F.2d 716. Allowing religious expression access to a public forum
does not violate the establishment clause for two reasons. Creating an open forum in which diverse
speakers, both religious and secular, can participate is a secular purpose, Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271;
McCreary, 739 F.2d at 725, and "an open forum... does not confer any imprimatur of state ap-
proval on religious sects or practices." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 (quoted in McCreary, 739 F.2d at
727).
131. See, eg., Knights of KKK v. East Baton Rouge School Bd., 578 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (5th
Cir. 1978); Cason v. City of Jacksonville, 497 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1974); National Socialist White
People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th Cir. 1973); Invisible Empire, KKK v. Mayor of
Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 286-87 (D. Md. 1988); NAACP v. Thompson, 648 F. Supp, 195, 225
(D. Md. 1986).
The less open and diverse the forum is, however, the more likely it is that the message of the
speaker may be imputed to the state. See generally Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574
(1974) ("If. . .the city or other governmental entity rations otherwise freely accessible... facilities,
the case for state action will naturally be stronger than if the facilities are simply available to all
comers without condition or reservation."). If only a few groups participate in the forum, an appear-
ance of state endorsement may also be conveyed. See Westside Community Schools, 110 S. Ct. at
2378 (Marshall, I., concurring).
132. See, eg., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (The government may discipline
employees who express themselves on matters of public concern when the employee's speech "im-
pedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the [govern-
ment's] enterprise."); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968).
133. Justice Scalia argues in dissent in Rankin that by protecting the expression of a clerical
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Similarly, the government can organize its activities in such a way
that private speakers who participate in state sponsored events must ex-
press themselves in a way that is consistent with the message that the
state is seeking to communicate. A college assembly created for the pur-
pose of discouraging drug use among students need not invite a speaker
advocating drug addiction as a desirable practice.' An extension of this
doctrine permits state institutions to limit the speech of private partici-
pants in state activities when that speech might be "erroneously attrib-
uted" '135 to the state institution itself. Thus, for example, in Hazelwood
School District v. KuhlmeierI36 the Court held that a high school "may in
its capacity as a publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a school
play 'disassociate itself'... from speech that is... biased or prejudiced"
without violating first amendment guarantees.'3 7
Although the Court's language in Hazelwood bears some resem-
blance to the endorsement analysis of the establishment clause, a lesser
showing is arguably sufficient to permit the regulation of speech in these
circumstances. Expressive activities that "the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school"' 38 may include many
more situations than those which technically constitute an endorsement
for establishment clause or equal protection purposes. Moreover, the
state may have a legitimate interest in promoting far more equality
among groups than the equal protection clause requires. If it is state
policy, for example, that homosexuals are as welcome as heterosexuals at
its institutions of higher learning, (a goal which exceeds the current un-
derstanding of equal protection guarantees), may not the state take steps
to assure that private speech does not create a false impression as to the
state's attitude on this subject?139
worker who spoke approvingly of an assassination attempt against then President Reagan, the ma-
jority had created a constitutional world "in which nonpolicymaking employees of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission must be permitted to make remarks on the job approving of
racial discrimination .. " 483 U.S. at 400-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's criticism overstates
the scope of the majority opinion, however. The Court clearly indicated that even low-level employ-
ees are not "insulated from discharge where their speech... truly injures the public interest in the
effective functioning of the public employer." Id at 391 n.18. See also McMullen v. Carson, 754
F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding discharge of sheriff's department employee who publicly
served as recruiter for Ku Klux Klan).
134. Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 578 (1980); M. NIMMER, supra note
17, at 4-85 n.236 is in accord.
135. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
136. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
137. Id. at 271 (quoting Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
138. Id.
139. The Hazelwood analysis extends beyond establishment clause and equal protection doctrine
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Unlike the state action and establishment clause analogies previ-
ously discussed, however, the Hazelwood holding is based on reasoning
which traditional first amendment proponents may well reject. Many
people understandably view the state's power to censor in these "impri-
matur" situations with grave suspicion, particularly at the university
level. 1" Still, it is one thing to argue that homophobic groups may meet
in two respects. First, some racist expression on a university campus may not imply state endorse-
ment of the invidious message to a sufficient degree to find state action. Thus, the university may not
be violating the equal protection clause directly by allowing the speech to occur. Nonetheless, the
university may be legitimately concerned that some members of the public may perceive the univer-
sity to support the racist message, and therefore may believe that such a perception interferes with
the university's ability to perform its educational mission.
For example, in Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985), the
administration of Prairie State College ordered the transfer of an artistic display created by a faculty
member in the Art Department from the main floor of the principal building on the campus to a less
conspicuous gallery in the same building. The art display involved graphic sexual representations
with offensive racist overtones. The college administration feared that the prominent presentation of
these works suggested college approval of their content, "an image of the college that would make it
harder to recruit students, especially black and female students." Id. at 630. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit upheld the transfer against constitutional challenge. One might legitimately
argue that the original site of the display did not constitute the communication of a racist message by
the state in violation of equal protection principles, while holding, nonetheless, that the transfer of
the display did not violate the first amendment under Hazelwood.
Second, and more importantly, by grounding the regulation of hate speech on equal protection
and establishment clause principles, the scope of permissible regulation is limited by the doctrinal
interpretation of these constitutional provisions. Thus, for example, because gay men and lesbians
are not recognized as a suspect class, invidious government speech directed at homosexuals would
not violate the Constitution. Certainly, a strong argument can be made that homosexuals do consti-
tute a suspect class, and, therefore, should fall within the coverage of the equal protection clause.
See, eg., Judge Norris' persuasive analysis in Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345-
49 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane). Unfortunately,
it is also clear, as Judge Reinhardt explains in his dissent in Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1352-56, that the
current Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), upholding the criminalization
of acts of homosexual sodomy, effectively precludes that result. The linchpin of suspect class analy-
sis is a showing of unjustified disfavored status. That foundation can never be established by a
Supreme Court that insists on seeing the "unreasoning prejudice" directed at homosexuals histori-
cally as "a permissible societal moral judgment." See Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1357 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
While the Court's failure to protect homosexuals against discrimination and prejudice as a consti-
tutional matter allows government to tolerate homophobic hate speech under this analysis, that
failure does not prevent the state from aggressively pursuing more progressive policies. The state
may, on the authority of Hazelwood, act to restrict private speech that might be erroneously attrib-
uted to it.
140. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REv. 143, 271-
79 (1988). The Court in Hazelwood explicitly left open the question of whether "the same degree of
deference is appropriate with respect to [the regulation of] school-sponsored expressive activities at
the college and university level." 484 U.S. 260, 274 n.7 (1988). Clearly, however, school sponsor-
ship must affect the first amendment analysis to some extent. Thus, in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990), Justice Blackmun explained:
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in college buildings along with dozens of other organizations including
the gay and lesbian alliances, and quite another to contend that the uni-
versity newspaper bearing the school's name and published in part with
school funds, can run a banner headline urging "Gays Off Campus" and
an editorial tacitly approving of "gay bashing," despite university policy
to the contrary. 14'
C. When Rights Conflict-Equality versus Neutrality Requirements
Sometimes the expression of private speech on public property vio-
lates the constitutional rights of a third party, not because the private
speech is attributed to the state or constitutes state action, but because it
interferes with an independent mandate that the state is constitutionally
obligated to implement. 42 In Cohen v. California,143 a high point in first
amendment jurisprudence despite its off-color particulars, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction of an individual who wore a jacket with
the words "Fuck the draft" emblazoned on it in the corridors of a Los
Angeles courthouse. Justice Harlan's opinion eloquently' rejected the
state's argument that Cohen's arrest was necessary to protect the sensi-
Obvious First Amendment problems would arise where government attempts to direct
the content of speech at private universities. Such content-based regulation of private
speech traditionally has carried with it a heavy burden of justification. Where, as was
the situation in the academic-freedom cases, government attempts to direct the content
of speech at public educational institutions, complicated First Amendment issues are
presented because government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator.
Id. at 587 n.6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
At least one court has questioned whether the Hazelwood "school sponsorship" rationale should
be rigorously applied at the college level, see DiBonav. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1346, 269
Cal. Rptr. 882, 893 (1990), but even it concedes that "school sponsorship is a factor which under
some circumstances can be considered at the college level." Id. at 1347, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893. The
court's refusal to read Hazelwood more broadly provoked a spirited dissent. Id. at 1353, 269 Cal.
Rptr. at 897 (Huffmnan, J., dissenting).
141. See DiBona, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 1347, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (distinguishing play at issue
from the school paper in Hazlewood on the basis that "in contrast to a school paper-which if it
allowed students to express themselves using profanity would implicitly condone ifs use--this play
does not advocate the use of vulgar speech").
This type of argument is a double-edged sword. If the administration of the university was viru-
lently homophobic in its policies, it would have the power to censor the campus newspaper to pre-
vent the publication of articles endorsing a more tolerant and egalitarian attitude toward gay people.
Thus, a Hazelwood analysis is more dangerous than the equal protection thesis which operates as a
one-way ratchet that only permits the regulation of invidious speech directed toward a suspect class.
142. In these cases, the requisite state action is found by the state's inaction in failing to regulate
private conduct that interferes with the accessibility of state institutions to minority group members.
See infra notes 149-50.
143. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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bilities of a captive audience, 144 and persuasively explained why first
amendment protection must extend not only to the literal ideas that an
individual seeks to express but also to the emotive force which the
speaker seeks to convey.1 45
Suppose, however, we change the facts of Cohen. Now petitioner is
wearing a message on his jacket inside a courtroom where a Jewish de-
fendant is being tried for murder. Moreover, the message is changed.
The jacket now reads "Kill the murdering k-e" rather than "Fuck the
draft." Assume further that there is no disruption in the courtroom and
that no one in the audience complains about the message being commu-
nicated. Surely in this situation the state may prohibit the wearing of the
jacket on the grounds that the message interferes with the defendant's
right to a fair trial. In this circumstance the defendant's sixth amend-
ment and due process rights trump the free speech rights of the trial
spectator.146
144. Id.
145. Id. at 25-26.
146. The need to balance the sixth amendment and due process rights of defendants against the
free speech rights of the press and others has long been recognized. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (evaluating propriety of gag order restraining pretrial publicity that
might undermine defendant's right to a fair trial). The regulation of possibly prejudicial expression
outside the courtroom has sometimes been reviewed under traditionally rigorous standards. In
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), for example, the Court overturned the contempt convic-
tion of a labor leader who was punished for sending a public telegram threatening a crippling strike
if the state court decided a labor dispute in a particular way. The Court ruled that the union leader's
expression did not constitute a clear and present danger that the administration ofjustice would be
impaired. Even here, however, "the Court in this line of cases has assumed that all behavior-
including purely communicative behavior-that prevents the fair adjudication of a case is punishable
as contempt." L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 857.
Expression that more closely and directly intrudes into courtroom proceedings may be restricted
under less stringent analysis. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) the Court explained:
The constitutional safeguards relating to the integrity of the criminal process attend
every stage of a criminal proceeding, starting with arrest and culminating with a trial "in
a courtroom presided over by a judge." There can be no doubt that they embrace the
fundamental conception of a fair trial, and that they exclude influence or domination by
either a hostile or friendly mob. There is no room at any stage of judicial proceedings for
such intervention; mob law is the very antithesis of due process. A State may adopt
safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all
stages is free from outside control and influence.
Id. at 562. (quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963)) (citations omitted).
Further, "the legislature has the right to recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and other
court officials, will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or near their
courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the trial." Id. at 565. Accordingly, notwithstanding
petitioners' arguments that their activities did not constitute a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration ofjustice, the Court rejected the implication that "crowds... demonstrating before a
courthouse may not be prohibited by a legislative determination based on experience that such con-
duct inherently threatens the judicial process." Id. at 566. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S.
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A more difficult conflict is presented in the following scenario. It is
the late 1950s in a southern community which has hitherto been segre-
gated. Under the impetus of Brown v. Board of Education,147 the school
board allows black children to enroll in a previously white school. The
first black child arrives and during recess he is all but surrounded by
taunting white classmates who shout racial epithets at him again and
again and again. The teachers watch contentedly as this event proceeds
and take no steps to intervene. The black child runs home and does not
return to the school. 148
Have the school authorities violated the equal protection clause in
this case? To put the question in more general terms, does the equal
protection clause impose an affirmative obligation on the administrators
of public property to make certain that the public facilities in their
charge are accessible to racial minorities?149 Are school authorities re-
quired to insure that school facilities provide an environment of equal
at 561-62 (balancing sixth amendment and due process rights to a fair trial against first amendment
right of the press to be free from prior restraints on publications relating to pretrial proceedings);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966) (Given the effect of press reports on trial proceed-
ings, "trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) ("While maximum freedom must be allowed the
press in carrying on this important function in a democratic society its exercise must necessarily be
subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process.").
Of course, prejudicial expression affecting the impartiality of jurors can always be remedied by
reversing the defendant's conviction. See, eg., Evans v. Young, 854 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1988) (third
party saying within hearing of jurors "hang him" with reference to defendant is presumptively preju-
dicial, but its effect may be rebutted); Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 744-46
(4th Cir. 1988) (third party statement to jurors that "I hope you fry the son-of-a-bitch" violates
defendant's sixth amendment rights). The reversal of conviction remedy, however, is hardly the
preferred approach to the problem. "[R]eversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule
and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interference." Sheppard, 384
U.S. at 363.
147. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
148. This is basically a true story. My wife, who grew up in Virginia and was just starting
school in 1955, remembers this event, although she is uncertain about many details. She told me the
story over ten years ago, and I keep remembering it. I hope the child who experienced it has been
able to exorcise the memory, but I doubt it. Professor Gunther may disagree with Professor Mat-
suda about regulating hate speech, see Gunther, Stanford's Free Speech Debate, supra note 3, but he
certainly agrees with her on one point-people who have had ethnic epithets directed at them do not
forget those occurrences.
149. The argument that the state has an affirmative duty to act, such that state inaction consti-
tutes state action, has a long and distinguished history, particularly with regard to equal protection
issues. See generally Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword "State Action," Equal Pro-
tection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); 'State Action" Requirement,
supra note 101, at 228-32; Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. Rnv. 39, 55-80 (1967); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the
"State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLuM. L. Rv. 855 n.5 (1968) (citing
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respect and self-worth for all suspect classes as well as for the
majority?150
The answers to these questions must consider two points. First,
from an equal protection perspective alone, it should not matter whether
several studies supporting the position that the fourteenth amendment "affirmatively requires states
... to secure racial equality in the salient aspects of public life").
Under the balancing analysis proposed by these writers and others, the state's tolerance of invidi-
ous private conduct can deprive racial minorities of the equal protection of the laws.
150. As the Court recently emphasized in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Constitution "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life,
liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose
an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through
other means." Id. at 195. Thus, the state bears no constitutional responsibility for failing to protect
a four-year-old child from being beaten almost to death by his father, even though state officials were
aware of the danger the boy was in. "As a general matter... a State's failure to protect an individ-
ual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." Id. at
197.
Justice Rhenquist's majority opinion, however, acknowledged two exceptions to the principle that
the Constitution only establishes negative rights limiting the state's power to act. First, "when the
State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being."
Id. at 199-200. "The affirmative duty to protect arises... from the limitation which [the State] has
imposed on [the incarcerated person's] freedom to act on his own behalf." Id. at 200. Apparently,
this exception may not require total incarceration before it applies. Rhenquist allows for the possi-
bility that the state might assume an affirmative duty to protect a child that it placed with abusive
foster parents, although the Court does not reach that issue. Id. at 201 n.9. See Lipscomb v. Sim-
mons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that state has "affirmative constitutional
duties toward foster care children"). Second, "the State may not ... selectively deny its protective
services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection clause." DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 197 n.3.
The argument in the text is an amalgam of both exceptions although it must stretch each of them
beyond the narrow description provided in DeShaney. Certainly, no student is forced to attend a
public university. On the other hand, higher education is an extraordinarily valuable opportunity,
instrumentally tied to one's future success in society. For many students, the public university may
be the only feasible source of advanced training and a degree. Moreover, while college students are
not institutionalized, many live a substantial part of their life on campus and, quite naturally, be-
come dependent on that environment in important respects. University authorities, in turn, often
provide food, housing, medical care and police protection to students attending their institution.
This relationship may be sufficiently "special" to impose a duty to act upon the state. See generally
Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1989) (state has duty to prevent harm to accused
burglary suspect in private club where city relegates law enforcement in private clubs to proprietors
of such establishments); Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723-24 (3d Cir.
1989) (placing affirmative duty on state to protect children in public school may not be inconsistent
with DeShaney).
More importantly, the typical public university provides its benefits to students by immersing
them in a total milieu. Students learn through a variety of mechanisms and interactions, not simply
through formal instruction. In this type of circumstance, the state's obligation to treat groups
equally becomes complex. It is not necessarily met by a hands-off policy of neutrality that allows
private discretionary acts to substantially limit the opportunities of particular groups to obtain edu-
cational benefits.
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the harassment is purely verbal or physical. The critical issue is whether
the state is under some affirmative obligation to provide equal educa-
tional opportunities to all students by supervising private conduct on
school grounds. Second, whether the harassment is physical, verbal or
both, the state may technically respond that its recess policy is even-
handed and neutral, since it would not intervene if the situation was re-
versed and black students were harassing white students. Moreover, the
state might explain that either white or black students are free, in this
predicament, to defend themselves as best they can. Of course, given the
minority status of the black students, the freedom to defend themselves
or to counterattack against their tormentors may be of little practical use.
But that should not detract from the technical neutrality of the state's
policies. 151
151. In one sense, the equal protection issue can be more easily resolved with regard to physical
assaults because it is highly unlikely that the university would refuse to sanction all acts of physical
violence against individuals. Thus, one can argue that by providing protection to any student, the
university obligates itself to protect all students. The equal protection analysis may not operate on
this level of generality, however. See, eg., McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d 409, 413
(5th Cir. 1989) (Plaintiffs cannot circumvent "the rule of DeShaney by converting every due process
claim into an equal protection claim via an allegation that state officers exercised their discretion to
act in one incident but not in another."). A more particularized inquiry will be necessary.
Suppose there are a series of nighttime sexual assaults on women on a public university campus.
Nonetheless, the university refuses to provide extra police protection to students using laboratories
or libraries late at night, who return to their dormitories through a poorly lit campus. The lack of
protection is technically neutral. Neither men nor women receive it. On the other hand, given the
facts stated, women have a greater need for this protection than do their male counterparts. By
failing to provide it, the university's facilities in the evening are technically open to everyone regard-
less of gender, but in practical terms, they are much more available to men than women.
The university's failure to supplement police protection at night raises equal protection concerns
for the same reason that a neutral policy tolerating hate speech implicates equal protection issues.
Majoritarian ethnic groups simply have far less need to have hate speech regulated. By neutrally
allowing such expression to occur, the university arguably provides unequal protection to its stu-
dents.
The strength of this argument, however, is undermined by the Court's emphasis on the purpose
rather than the effect of state policy in equal protection cases. Under current equal protection juris-
prudence, neutral policies that do not discriminate on their face only violate constitutional require-
ments if they are invidiously motivated. See, eg., Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Generally speaking, proof of impermis-
sible intent requires more than official recognition that the government's facially neutral policy will
disadvantage minority groups. Plaintiffs must also show that the state's conduct was undertaken
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Feeney, 442
U.S. at 279.
This deliberate purpose requirement applies with equal rigor in state inaction cases. It raises a
formidable barrier, for example, to women bringing equal protection challenges to police enforce-
ment policies recommending non-intervention in cases of domestic violence. See, e.g., McKee, 877
F.2d at 416 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Note, Battered Women dnd the Equal Protection Clause: Will
the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1985-86). Using similar
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One may, of course, argue that the equal protection clause is appli-
cable in the physical assault context, but that the speech scenario
presents a different case. It is undisputed that no one has a constitutional
right to physically assault another person. 152 However, if equal protec-
tion rights exist in the physical assault context, changing the assault to
verbal abuse alone should not alter that conclusion. What is different is
that with verbal abuse, a clash of rights exists, requiring a balancing of
constitutional interests, while with physical assault, equal protection
rights are impaired with nothing of constitutional value on the other
side.153 As in the hypothetical involving the extension of Cohen v. Call-
logic, university administrations would not violate equal protection requirements by tolerating hate
speech against minorities on their campus as long as the administrator's purpose was to promote first
amendment values, not to burden the members of a suspect class.
This invidious motive requirement is not necessarily an insurmountable problem, however, be-
cause the Court's evaluation of the evidence establishing discriminatory intent is not always as rigor-
ous as the Feeney case suggests. In particular substantive areas, most notably school desegregation
cases, the Court has been willing to infer intent from the state decisionmakers' awareness that their
facially neutral policies would have discriminatory consequences. See, eg., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN,
C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONsTITONAL LAW 557-62 (Ist.ed. 1986); Ortiz, The Myth of
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (1989). Extending this analysis to the provision
of equal educational opportunities in state universities would facilitate the doctrinal argument for an
equal protection obligation to regulate hate speech suggested in the text. Alternatively, one could
challenge the intent requirement directly, and argue that the Court should pay greater attention to
discriminatory effects. See generally Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory
of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977). Indeed, the Court's unwillingness to
consider discriminatory effects alone can itself be criticized as a misguided attempt to view statutes
as operating neutrally when their obvious consequence is to increase inequality. See Sunstein, Loch-
ner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. Rav. 873, 897-98 (1987).
Realistically speaking, of course, it is unlikely that the current Court would support either of
these developments. If the Court determines that hate speech at universities can be constitutionally
restricted, based on past experience, one would expect it to justify that conclusion by reducing the
protection provided to freedom of speech on public property, see supra notes 12-39 and accompany-
ing text, rather than expanding the scope of the equal protection clause. Under the constitutional
value system endorsed in this article, the preferable approach is to ground the regulation of hate
speech on a doctrinal foundation that holds both free speech and equality interests in high esteem.
152. Federal courts often acted aggressively after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
to prevent private interference with school desegregation policies. Federal intervention against pri-
vate disruption was justified, for example, under the implied right of school authorities to be free to
comply with their constitutional obligations. See Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957);
Brewer v. Hoxie, 238 F.2d 91, 95-102 (8th Cir. 1956). Courts also recognized that because of the
interplay of interests between school authorities and students in their charge, injunctions could be
issued at the school board's request to protect the equal protection rights of black children against
private obstruction. Brewer, 238 F.2d at 104-05. The first amendment claims of the protesters were
rejected under a clear and present danger analysis. Id. at 102; Brittain, 245 F.2d at 95-96.
153. A hypothetical falling somewhere between the physical assault and free speech examples
may help to clarify the discussion. Suppose the issue is not speech, but rather association. Assume
that in a classroom with more than enough seats for all the students in attendance, students are
1991] REGULATING HATE SPEECH 43
fornia and the Jewish defendant's right to a fair trial, the question to be
resolved is whether limits on freedom of speech are justified by the state's
obligation to comply with a countervailing constitutional mandate. 15 4
How should this conflict be resolved? At its most abstract level, the
conflict represents the tension between neutrality and equality principles.
Under the first aniendment's command of content and viewpoint neutral-
ity, the government meets its constitutional obligations by treating every-
one the same in a very basic way. The state does not intervene in the
marketplace of ideas (at least not through the mechanism of regulating
private activities). Everyone is neutrally left alone to say whatever he or
she wishes. Conversely, seminal equal protection cases such as Brown v.
Board of Education, reject this kind of neutrality framework in the name
of equality. Treating everyone the same, by allowing both blacks and
whites the "freedom" not to associate with members of another race in
public school, does not result in equality. When one group is the major-
ity and the other is a minority, ostensibly neutral rules like those that
allow one race to segregate itself from the other may be the essence of
permitted to sit wherever they like, and the white students refuse to sit next to nonwhite students.
Since there are only a few minority students in the class, they end up sitting in a small cluster,
surrounded by concentric circles of empty seats and, then, their white peers. May the school admin-
istration and teachers constitutionally permit this seat selection procedure to operate undisturbed, or
are they obliged to intervene? Again, the school's policy is technically neutral, but as the results of
this policy become clear, the continuation of the policy raises an inference of deliberate discrimina-
tion. See supra note 151.
In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the Court pro-
hibited the University of Oklahoma Graduate School from assigning its first black student (admitted
under Court order) to a seat in a classroom in a row for black students only and to his own table in
the library and cafeteria. While recognizing that white students might still set themselves apart from
the petitioner, the Court concluded that such private decisions raised a totally different Constitu-
tional issue from state mandated segregation:
There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions imposed by
the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of
individuals to commingle where the state presents no such bar. The removal of the state
restrictions will not necessarily abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and
choices. But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity
to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own merits.
Id. at 641-42 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948)).
It is not clear to me that the McLaurin analysis, preceding Brown as it did, is still good law.
While there may not be any constitutional obligation that requires a bigoted white student to sit next
to an Hispanic student in the school cafeteria, classrooms should not be permitted to be segregated
as a matter of private preference. The students attending such a divided class are not receiving an
equal education since the minority students are subjected to a continuous affront to their dignity as
they try to learn their lessons. In this context the white students' associational rights and interests
should be subordinate to the equal protection clause's affirmative commands.
154. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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inequality. 155 The government may be acting neutrally, but it is neither
equal nor fair to tell the single black child that the only remedy he has
for the abuse he experiences is self-help; he is free to throw taunts back at
his twenty or thirty tormentors. 156
There is no simple way to reconcile the inconsistent values of neu-
trality and equality. One might begin the process by isolating locations
and situations in which one principle or the other should be recognized
as dominant. For example, in areas of the public university campus that
are designated full-purpose public forums, neutrality rules should control
the regulation of expressive activities.157 Minority group members may
choose either to participate fully in expressive activities taking place in
such environments, or to avoid these areas because they find much of the
speech uttered there unacceptably offensive. 158 In other areas of the
155. In his now famous criticism of Brown, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), Professor Wechsler queried, in essence, why the associa-
tional rights of black students to be educated in an integrated school should necessarily outweigh the
associational rights of white students who strongly preferred a segregated environment. There
seemed to be no neutral principle to justify such a conclusion. The response to Wechsler by other
scholars effectively repudiated his contention. Segregation is unconstitutional because it disadvan-
tages black people by treating them unequally. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Deci-
sions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). For all the force and accuracy of Black's rejoinder, however, it does
not negate Wechsler's basic premise. If you ignore the reality of majority and minority status and
differences in social and political power, Brown is a problematic non-neutral decision. In the real
world, however, abstract neutrality is often inherently inconsistent with equality. To Professor
Black, the blatant real-world inequality of segregation simply overwhelmed any concerns that might
be raised about the violation of neutrality principles in Brown.
156. The first amendment's neutrality requirements can also be challenged as being inconsistent
with more generalized equality concerns regarding groups such as the poor, who may lack the ability
to effectively compete in the marketplace of ideas. See, eg., Sunstein, Lochner'r Legacy, supra note
151, at 914. Moreover, facial neutrality can often shield hidden discrimination against disfavored
speakers. See, eg., Karst, Equality and the First Amendment, 43 U. Cml. L. REv. 20, 35-43 (1975).
157. This result is compelled by accepted case authority. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (religious groups must be given access to public forum created by university); Texas
Review Soc'y v. Cunningham, 659 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (rigorous scrutiny applied to
West Mall area on university campus designated as a public forum); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp.
676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Nazis
have right to demonstrate in traditional public forum in community in which many concentration
camp survivors reside). It is also consistent with the central thesis of this article which rejects cate-
gorical limits on expression in favor of the contextual regulation of speech. The regulation of hate
speech on the university campus requires the balancing of conflicting first amendment and equal
protection mandates. Neither constitutional value, however, totally dominates the other. Thus,
some hate speech must be tolerated on campus. The question is where it should be permitted and in
what circumstances.
158. On a large campus, this rule is much more easily defended than in a smaller institution. At
the University of California, Davis, for example, a very large open field between the main library and
the student union serves as a public forum in which diverse speakers may address whomever will
listen to them. It is simple to ignore the comments of an offensive speaker in this area. Indeed, the
1991] REGULATING HATE SPEECH
campus, however, equality rules should control. In these locations, gov-
ernment may protect rights of equal access on a basis of equal status and
worth even if to do so requires violating neutrality principles with regard
to the regulation of speech.
The allocation between neutrality and equality regimes should be
balanced.159 The creation of a small free-speech zone in the basement of
overwhelming majority of students ignore speakers in this area regardless of the merits of the
speaker's expression. In situations such as this, objecting to a speaker's hateful message is almost
analogous to objecting to a racist book in the university library. The problem is not that the message
is directed at a victim who cannot escape its disruptive effect on his education. Rather, the objection
is that the message exists at all and that some people think it is of sufficient value to listen to it or
read it. In circumstances of this kind, first amendment interests outweigh equal protection concerns.
See generally DiBona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 1346-47 n.14, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882, 893,
893 n.14 (1990) (first amendment protects right of teacher and students in drama class to put on
offensive play where participation and attendance is completely voluntary and easily avoided).
The more difficult scenario involves the small educational institution in which the only feasible
location for an open forum is a central area in the university's main building that effectively controls
access to the rest of the institution. There is no easy answer to the clash of first amendment and
equal protection principles in this situation. It is not clear that designating such an area as a public
forum necessarily requires the conclusion that hate speech must be tolerated there. See generally
Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (1990) (per-
mitting religious clubs to participate in open forum in public high school does not violate establish-
ment clause if religious groups do not dominate the forum and school disclaims any endorsement of
club's message); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3104 n.50 (1989) (even if central
location in county courthouse is used for a variety of public displays, permitting a private creche to
be displayed there may violate establishment clause); Smith v. County of Albemarle, Virginia, 895
F.2d 953, 959 (4th Cir. 1990) (private creche in public forum in front of city hall violates establish-
ment clause); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989) (that park in front of
city hall is a public forum does not preclude conclusion that permitting a menorah display to be
located there violates establishment clause); Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625
(7th Cir. 1985) (Even if gallery on main floor of small college's main building is a public forum, first
amendment rights of artist are not abridged if his offensive display is relocated to a less prominent
forum elsewhere in the building.). To take the most extreme case, it is doubtful that unrestrained
private racist speech should be tolerated in a one-room schoolhouse simply because the school au-
thorities designate it as a public forum at specific times during the school day.
159. See generally Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, IOU. PA. L. REv.
473, 488-90 (1962) (arguing for a balance between equal protection rights and limited substantive
due process rights of privacy, property, and liberty):
No algebraic formula nor any conjuring with the words of the Constitution can define
with precision the limits of the state's choices. What the fourteenth amendment requires
of the state in regard to the conflicting demands of liberty and equality has appeared
different at different times.... At one time it might have appeared that the Constitu-
tion required that the state remain "neutral." We now ask what constitutes constitution-
ally acceptable neutrality. We ask, again, whether government need be-or can be-
"neutral." In fact, it is now established, neutrality is not required by the Constitution in
all instances of this conflict....
*..In regard to elections, company towns, public parking authorities, and the like, the
Constitution requires the state not to be neutral, but to act to prevent inequality.... In
"private" areas, the state may perhaps be neutral, but the requirements of neutrality
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a seldom used building would hardly be appropriate or adequate. On the
other hand, protecting racial minorities against verbal abuse requires a
better response than that they should simply develop thick skins or avoid
most of campus life. Such a response too closely resembles the discred-
ited notion that children of religious minorities could simply wait in the
cloakroom while school prayers were recited if majoritarian religious ex-
pression made them feel uncomfortable. 160
A corollary of this analysis is that it is particularly inappropriate for
some areas of public university campuses to be designated as sites for
unrestricted expression or to be considered public forums. 161 Such areas
include critical access points and facilities which are essential for student
use. If the entrance to the library is a foyer with empty walls on either
side, the walls could be used as open bulletin boards for student groups.
Should that arrangement result in minority students having to walk
through a gauntlet of racial invective to enter the library, however, one
might legitimately question whether their access to that facility has been
unacceptably restricted. While other areas may suitably serve the univer-
have also changed. We now recognize that the state is favoring the liberty to discrimi-
nate and is not "neutral" when it enforces [discriminatory private decisions]....
... But there are circumstances where the discriminator can invoke a protected liberty
which is not constitutionally inferior to the claim of equal protection. There the Consti-
tution requires or permits the state to favor the right to discriminate over the victim's
claim to equal protection.... [This] may... be viewed as the result of the inevitable
need to choose between competing constitutional rights....
160. See, eg., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1961) (rejecting argument that Regents prayer
in public school is constitutional because state "does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but
permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room").
161. In a distinct but related context, some lower courts have recognized that the location of a
public forum is an important factor to consider in evaluating the constitutionality of speech regula-
tions governing access to the forum. See supra note 158. In County of.Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953, for
example, the court carefully distinguished different public forum cases in explaining how Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test of the establishment clause, (in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692
(1984)), applies in an "area where the competing First Amendment rights of free speech and separa-
tion of church and state overlap." Id. at 959 n.7. Religious expression might be constitutionally
permissible in certain forums, but not others because it is more likely to convey a message of state
endorsement in certain locations. "The associational message [of a creche on the front lawn of the
county government building] is more severe than a simple policy of access to vacant school rooms,"
(as in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)), id. at 959, or the open forum in a village park, (as in
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984)). Id. at 959 n.7.
The analysis in the text parallels this endorsement inquiry, but from a different perspective. The
direct analogy to the endorsement test asks whether racist speech in a particular location implies
state approval of the speaker's message. By focusing on the state's obligation to provide an egalita-
rian educational environment, the inquiry now shifts to the effect of racist speech in specific areas on
the ability of minority group members to avail themselves of the educational opportunities that the
university provides.
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sity's commitment to open and uninhibited debate, there may be no other
way to enter the library.
D. Anti-Discrimination Interests and First Amendment Rights
The approaches suggested thus far for regulating hate speech on
public university campuses, may, of course, be rejected. Readers may
fear that a functional compatibility test gives far too much discretion to
administrators and regulators.162 The analogy between the establishment
clause and the equal protection clause for state action purposes may be
discounted on the ground that these constitutional provisions serve dif-
ferent purposes.1 63 The equal protection clause may be interpreted to bar
state interference with minority access to public property, but not to im-
pose affirmative obligations on the state to protect that access against
private obstructions. 164
If all of the previously stated arguments are repudiated as unpersua-
sive, one remaining ground exists for restricting hate speech on public
university campuses. Courts could ignore the public ownership of uni-
versity property and apply traditional standards of review to hate speech
regulations-the same stringent standards that are used to review the
regulation of private speech in the private sector or in a traditional public
forum.1 65 Since hate speech regulations involve either content or view-
point discrimination, some form of strict scrutiny must be used. 166 Still,
even this exacting standard may sometimes be met. The state's interest
in prohibiting racist invective directed against minority students is suffi-
ciently important and can be furthered with sufficiently precise rules that
some carefully drawn hate speech regulations should withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. This kind of conventional balancing of state interests and
rights will not often be helpful, but it may have utility in certain limited
situations.
In particular, there are two lines of authority which might support
162. See supra notes 85, 88 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311 (1986) (arguing that establish-
ment clause protects equal liberty of people of all faiths to practice their religions, but it does not
require equality of civil status of religious groups). For the contrary position, see Heavenly and
Earthly Spheres, supra note 1.
164. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1949)
(suggesting that state may not require social isolation of black student in formally segregated gradu-
ate program, but it may tolerate private action that accomplishes the same result).
165. See, eg., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (public forum); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (private speech).
166. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540.
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the regulation of hate speech under conventional strict scrutiny stan-
dards. The first involves speech that unreasonably intrudes on the pri-
vacy of an unconsenting listener. Most of the case law relating to this
type of circumstance is directed at protecting one's home from invasive
expression.167 Martin v. Struthers 168 suggests that states may protect res-
idential tranquility and privacy against disturbance by prohibiting solicit-
ing that ignores posted "do not disturb" signs. Rowan v. United States
Post Office Department 169 allows recipients of sexually provocative and
pandering advertisements to request the post office to order the publisher
to desist from any future mailings to that addressee. In Frisby v.
Schultz,170 the Court upheld a content-neutral ban on residential picket-
ing intended "to intrude upon the targeted resident ... in an especially
offensive way." 17' Arguments have been made that other locations in-
volving particularly private and personal activities, such as medical clin-
ics, may also be protected against offensive expression.72 While most of
these cases involve content neutral laws, which receive less rigorous scru-
tiny than content or viewpoint discrimination, the very high value placed
by the Court on protecting an individual's privacy in special locations
might justify upholding some restrictions on expression under a higher
standard of review. This same line of reasoning might allow administra-
tors to prevent minority students' dormitory rooms and study carrels, at
least, from being the target sites of racist invective.
The second doctrinal framework under which hate speech restric-
tions may withstand rigorous scrutiny relates to anti-discrimination laws
that have sometimes been used to limit and punish private expression.
The extreme case proves the technical efficacy of the model, but its pa-
rameters remain open. Assume a private restaurant claims to comply
with civil rights statutes regulating access to public accommodations by
167. See, ag., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970):
While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to
prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which
cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue, we have at the same time consistently
stressed that "we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to
objectionable speech."
Id. at 21 (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)) (citation
omitted). But see Lehmen v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (commuters are captive
audience for advertising on municipal buses).
168. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
169. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
170. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
171. Id. at 486.
172. See Note, Too Close for Comfort: Protesting Outside Medical Faclities, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1856 (1988).
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agreeing to serve black patrons. However, the restaurant's walls are cov-
ered with posters promoting white supremacy and the inferiority of non-
white races, the napkins and place settings are decorated with racial epi-
thets, and the waiters and waitresses insult black customers with racist
vulgarities. Obviously, in practical terms, this restaurant is not open to
black customers. It would take a first amendment absolutist of the high-
est order to argue that freedom of speech guarantees preclude the en-
forcement of civil rights laws against the proprietor of this establishment.
The more common circumstance in which anti-discrimination laws
are used to sanction racist expression involves Title VII cases in which
employers are accused of creating or condoning a work environment that
is hostile and offensive to racial minorities or women.173 Although plain-
tiff must demonstrate "that more than a few, isolated incidents of racial
harassment have taken place," '174 the case law clearly indicates that a
work environment pervaded with racist epithets and derogatory com-
ments directed at minority or women workers, constitutes actionable dis-
crimination1 75 as to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 176
173. See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983)
("An employer violates Title VII simply by creating or condoning an environment at the work place
which significantly and adversely affects the psychological well-being of an employee because of his
or her race."); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (pervasive sexual harassment in
workplace constitutes "an illegal and discriminatory condition of employment"); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982) (hostile or offensive work atmosphere created by sexual
harassment violates Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (injection of
"demeaning sexual stereotypes into the general work environment" violates Title VII); Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) ("derogatory comments"
may be "so excessive and opprobrious as to constitute an unlawful employment practice under Title
VII"); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (evidence of
pornography and demeaning sexual comments raises triable issue of fact in Title VII case); United
States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), modified and aff'd, 633 F.2d 643 (2d
Cir. 1980).
174. Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d
Cir. 1986). See also Gilbert, 722 F.2d at 1394 ("[r]acial remarks and derogatory epithets" used by
white officers, racially oriented graffiti in restrooms, and racial cartoon on bulletin board at police
headquarters do not rise to level of Title VII violation); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 67 (4th
Cir. 1978) ("isolated incidents of racial tension did not constitute a violation of Title VII"); Cariddi,
568 F.2d at 88 (derogatory comments made in casual conversation do not rise to level of Title VII
violation); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D. Minn. 1980)
(requiring more than a few isolated incidents of harassment to find a Title VII violation).
175. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 254 (plaintiff subjected to "extremely vulgar and offensive sexu-
ally related epithets" by coworkers in workplace "pervaded with sexual slur, insult and innuendo");
Henson, 682 F.2d at 900-01 (female employees regularly subjected to crude and vulgar language and
"almost daily inquiry... as to their sexual habits and proclivities"); Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944 ("sexu-
ally stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions" directed at female employee by male supervi-
sor); Snell, 611 F. Supp. 521 (demeaning epithets and derogatory mimicking directed at black and
Hispanic employees, scurrilous statements and cartoons posted on bulletin board and other areas);
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Moreover, the willingness of courts to deny relief based on occasional,
casual or sporadic episodes of racist expression by fellow employees
against minority coworkers may stem in significant part from the need to
demonstrate that it is the employer who should be held responsible for
the racist incidents on which plaintiffs base their complaints. 177 Nothing
in the case law suggests that employers would be held to violate the first
amendment rights of their employees if they punished even minor inci-
dents of racial harassment on the basis that it makes no sense to wait
until the workplace is engulfed by racially abusive incidents among
workers before taking action. By that time, not only might plaintiff's
cause of action have already accrued, thereby exposing the employer to
liability, but the cost of policing the workplace and disciplining workers
would have increased substantially.
178
While Title VII cases rarely discuss first amendment concerns di-
rectly, 179 the willingness of courts to enforce civil rights statutes against
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. at 384-85 ("anti-black sentiments" expressed verbally, on
company bulletin board, on wall of restroom, on door of lunchroom, and on sides of loading carts);
City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (racial slurs and comments directed at black employees, posted on
bulletin boards, and transmitted over police radio). But see Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805
F.2d 611, 615, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (anti-female obscenities
directed at plaintiff and referring to women generally, and display of pictures of nude women in
work area do not violate Title VII given the traditionally vulgar atmosphere in the work
environment).
176. See, eg., Gilbert, 722 F.2d at 1994; Katz, 709 F.2d at 254-55; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904;
Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-45; Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
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REGULATING HATE SPEECH
expressive activities cannot be ignored. College administrators are
obliged by Title VII requirements to ensure that university employees do
not create a racially offensive environment for their coworkers. If admin-
istrators are constitutionally permitted to take steps to create a nondis-
criminatory work environment for university employees, that surely
suggests that some regulation of student speech may be enforced to pre-
vent the creation of a discriminatory educational environment for stu-
dents as well.
CONCLUSION
Because hate speech is defined by its content and communicative
impact, its regulation raises serious first amendment concerns. Even
speech which is invidious in its purpose and insidious in its effect merits
constitutional protection because it is speech.
Expression that cannot be constitutionally suppressed, however, can
be regulated as to its location. The very power of speech that justifies its
recognition as a fundamental right also requires that limits be placed on
where it may occur. Speech can distort and disrupt the uses to which
property may be put. The first amendment does not give individuals an
unconditional easement to exercise that power and cause such distortions
in any area they choose. Thus, restrictions of the kind proposed in this
article go beyond pristine and neutral time, place and manner regula-
tions. These regulations are hybrids; they are content-based but are justi-
fied in terms of the site at which the expression is to occur. In order for
such regulations to be upheld, the speech being regulated must be incom-
patible with important functions the state has assigned to the property it
owns and controls.
A functional compatibility standard of review, however, is ad hoc
and indeterminate and risks judicial toleration of overregulation. It in-
vites discretionary choices by property administrators and casts a chilling
web of uncertain sanctions over potential speakers. With regard to con-
ventional expression involving even hotly debated issues, conclusions of
incompatibility should be cautiously arrived at and grounded on hard
evidence of disruptive effects.
Some hate speech restrictions, however, involve a different balance,
one that is cabined in its scope but more aggressive in its implementation.
Administrators of public property are subject to two constitutional com-
mands, one imposed by the first amendment and the other by the equal
protection clause. Equality principles require that public facilities be ac-
cessible to all suspect classes on a basis of equal worth and mutual re-
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spect. In situations in which the majority is actively intolerant of
minorities, that equality mandate cannot be fulfilled by a government
committed to absolute neutrality in the regulation of expression.
This is not to suggest that all hate speech may be excluded from a
public university campus. The analogies suggested here are context-
based. Hate speech may be prohibited in certain circumstances but not
others. Clearly, difficult questions remain as to how such lin-drawing
and balancing issues should be resolved. The thesis of this article only
involves the development of general doctrine, not particular rules or
standards. It does not directly address how to draft hate speech regula-
tions that are not substantially overbroad, that do not grant too much
discretion to those responsible for enforcing the regulations, that provide
adequate notice to students and professors, and that do not unreasonably
chill clearly protected and permissible expression.
What this article does present is a justification for regulating hate
speech, a challenge to the instinctive reaction of many academics that
any regulation of speech in the university environment is ill-advised and
per se unconstitutional. Contrary to that intuitive conclusion, prohibit-
ing hate speech on public property can be solidly grounded on respected
constitutional authority. Appropriate constitutional analogies suggest
that the line-drawing and uncertainty inherent in the regulation of hate
speech is a tolerable burden on the academic enterprise. It is time to shift
the discussion from the abstract question of whether hate speech restric-
tions are ever legitimate to the tough job of tailoring and balancing that
the regulation of hate speech demands.
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